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IP AND ANTITRUST:  
REFORMATION AND HARM 
Christina Bohannan* 
Herbert Hovenkamp** 
Abstract: Antitrust and intellectual property (“IP”) law both seek to im-
prove economic welfare by facilitating competition, and investment in in-
novation. At various times both antitrust and IP law have wandered off 
this course and have become more driven by special interests. Today, anti-
trust and IP are on very different roads to reform. Antitrust reform began 
in the late 1970s and is largely complete. Today, patent law has begun its 
own reform journey, but it is in a much earlier stage. The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos did not reform patent law sig-
nificantly, however, some of its language may lead to closer examination 
of some method patent applications. Unfortunately, the outlook for copy-
right reform is bleaker. An important component of antitrust reform has 
been the development of a concept of harm that effectuates the underly-
ing policy of making markets more competitive. In its 1977 decision in 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., the Supreme Court largely ig-
nored the language of an expansive antitrust damages provision that ap-
parently gives private plaintiffs a remedy for every injury caused by an an-
titrust violation. Rather, the Court said, harm is cognizable only when it 
threatens to make markets less competitive. We propose a concept of “IP 
injury” that limits IP remedies to situations in which the IP holder has suf-
fered or is likely to suffer harm sufficiently linked to the purpose of IP 
law, which is to incentivize innovation. As in antitrust, reformation in IP is 
more likely to come from the judiciary and not from Congress. 
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Introduction 
 No legal policies are more important for innovation, competition 
and economic development than the antitrust and intellectual property 
(“IP”) laws. Both antitrust and IP law have wandered off course, how-
ever, subordinating public-regarding concerns for competition and in-
novation to interest group demands. Today they are on very different 
paths to reform. Antitrust’s decades-long period of isolation, redefini-
tion, and retrenchment is largely completed. The reforms that are not 
yet finished belong to the IP laws, particularly patent and copyright, the 
two bodies of IP law expressly authorized by the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution.1 During the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, antitrust policy lost much of its concern with economic competi-
tion and started protecting less efficient small businesses from the 
lower costs of larger firms.2 Then, beginning in the late 1970s, the Su-
preme Court moved antitrust law in a new direction, toward the protec-
tion of consumers.3 By the same token, patent and copyright law have 
lost their focus on facilitating the type and amount of innovation 
needed to benefit consumers and turned toward the protection of 
rights holders, often at the expense of economic progress.4 
 The linkage of IP and competition policy is hardly novel.5 But our 
concern here is not to apply established antitrust doctrine in IP-
intensive areas. Rather, we try to develop the basis for a common legal 
theory for fostering innovation and growth. Identifying the appropriate 
scope of IP protection is as much a question of competition policy as of 
patent or copyright policy. Overly broad IP rights or infringement doc-
trines that are too lax about proof of harm serve to create unjustified 
regions of behavior that are protected from competition, thereby 
threatening innovation. In very much the same way, excessive enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws without concern about competitive injury 
protects firms from competition and undermines the incentive to in-
novate. In both cases, consumers are the victims. 
 In both antitrust and IP, meaningful reform requires two things. 
First, substantive doctrine must be revised to bring the law into align-
                                                                                                                      
1 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 
1 (2005). 
3 See id. at 2. 
4 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 969, 969 (2007). 
5 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Anti-
trust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law (2d ed. 2010). 
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ment with the underlying policy. Better substantive law, however, is not 
a complete answer. By their nature, both antitrust and IP law continu-
ally confront phenomena in areas that are poorly understood, and 
where legal remedies are likely to do more harm than good. 
 Second, antitrust and IP law need a new focus on the degree and 
kind of harm required for a violation. As the Supreme Court has discov-
ered through many years of interpreting the antitrust laws in private 
plaintiff actions, antitrust is complex and true reform is lurching, 
piecemeal and often elusive.6 One way to avoid the pitfalls created by 
ambiguous and complex substantive law is to ensure that the harm that 
is claimed is consistent with the underlying purpose of those laws.7 For 
example, predicting the economic consequences of a merger is ex-
traordinarily difficult, and the chance of error is correspondingly high.8 
But if a plaintiff is complaining that a merger caused more rather than 
less competition in a market, why bother with the difficult substantive 
analysis? The very nature of the plaintiff’s claim tells us that we do not 
want to condemn this particular merger, at least not for the reason that 
the plaintiff claims. As we argue in Part V, we can often address prob-
lems of IP overreaching and complex and ambiguous doctrine by simply 
avoiding intractable questions of substance. Rather, courts need to ask 
more frequently whether the type of harm of which the plaintiff com-
plains is sufficiently related to the underlying goals of IP laws, which can 
be defended only on the grounds that they encourage innovation. 
 We begin in Part I by giving an account of antitrust’s journey to 
redemption and of how reform was accomplished largely by the judici-
ary—in apparent conflict with a statute that seemed both clear and in-
flexible.9 Part II then examines the state of reform in IP laws generally10 
before turning to specific issues involving patents in Part III,11 and 
copyright in Part IV.12 Finally, in Part V we urge courts to develop the 
concept of “IP injury,” similar to the concept of “antitrust injury” in the 
                                                                                                                      
6 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (over-
ruling century of precedent and applying rule of reason to resale price maintenance); 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (adopting similar, maximum resale price main-
tenance). 
7 Cf. Bohannan, supra note 4, at 1031. 
8 On the need for simplifying assumptions and prophylactic rules in merger analysis, 
see 4 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 905, at 30 (3d ed. 
2009). 
9 See infra notes 14–51 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 52–147and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 148--440 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 441--496 and accompanying text. 
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antitrust laws, which links the type of harm that a plaintiff must show to 
the underlying purpose of those laws.13 True IP reform requires both a 
reconsideration of its substance and the formulation of a theory of 
harm that is linked to the underlying goals of those laws. 
 Our evaluation of antitrust, patent, and copyright law leads us to 
conclude that courts are far more likely than Congress to be the en-
gines of true reform. The revolution in antitrust was undertaken almost 
exclusively by the courts, in the face of a clear and aggressive statute 
that would seem to make a strenuous harm requirement impossible. 
The transformation that is currently occurring in patent law is also very 
largely the work of the Supreme Court. Although the cleansing of the 
Copyright Act remains mainly in the future, nothing gives us hope that 
the needed reforms will come from Congress; therefore, the courts 
must act to reform this area of the law as well. 
I. The Reformation of Antitrust Policy 
 The story of antitrust reform is well known.14 The half-century pe-
riod that ended in the late 1970s had seen many antitrust infidelities, 
mainly from expansion that today seems unprincipled, given that injury 
to competition was so often absent. Among these was the doctrine that 
mergers in highly competitive markets should be condemned if they 
permitted the post-merger firm to undersell smaller rivals;15 the Utah 
Pie doctrine that recent entrants into a market could not use aggressive 
pricing against a dominant firm there if they were charging higher 
prices somewhere else;16 the doctrine that vertical non-price restraints 
should be unlawful per se;17 the doctrine that tying arrangements 
should be unlawful even if the seller lacked serious market power and 
the tie excluded no one;18 and the doctrine that purely vertical agree-
                                                                                                                      
13 See infra notes 497--558 and accompanying text. 
14 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
15 See generally FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (condemning a 
merger because it would create economies in advertising); United States v. Von’s Grocery 
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (stating a similar proposition); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294 (1962) (condemning a merger because the post-merger firm would be able 
to undersell smaller stores). 
16 See generally Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (finding it unlaw-
ful for firms operating in many markets to undersell a dominant firm in its local market). 
17 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967) (explaining 
that vertical non-price restraints are unlawful per se), overruled by Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977) (explaining that vertical non-price restraints should 
be subjected to rule of reason). 
18 See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (tying of patented prod-
uct presumptively unlawful), overruled by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 
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ments maintaining either maximum or minimum resale prices were 
unlawful per se.19 In this period, antitrust law was substantially overde-
terrent. That is, it condemned a good deal of conduct that was pro-
competitive and in the process forced consumers to pay higher prices. 
 What went wrong with antitrust following World War II was not all 
that different from what is wrong with the IP laws today. In both areas 
the legal policy became disconnected from its articulated goals and be-
gan pursuing other ends. Antitrust shielded small businesses from 
competition that would have benefitted consumers. Similarly, IP law 
expanded entitlements for the benefit of patent and copyright holders, 
often at the expense of innovation, which always relies on the work of 
predecessors as well as a robust public domain. The ultimate victims, 
once again, were consumers. 
 In the case of antitrust, people initially placed the blame for this 
disconnection on the Supreme Court—something that Robert Bork and 
Ward Bowman did forcefully in their disturbing 1965 article, The Crisis in 
Antitrust, and that Bork expanded thirteen years later in The Antitrust 
Paradox.20 More recently, the tendency has been to blame private plain-
tiffs and the private treble damages enforcement system.21 In reality, 
however, Congress and the government antitrust enforcement agencies 
were behind most of it. For example, the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court de-
cision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. was an aggressive decision 
that condemned manufacturer-imposed territorial restrictions because 
they were restraints on alienation, not because they had any impact on 
competition.22 In 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, condemned a merger because it injured smaller rivals, al-
                                                                                                                      
28, 46 (2006) (asserting that there is no presumption of market power from patented tying 
product). 
19 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (holding that maximum resale 
price maintenance is unlawful per se), overruled by Khan, 522 U.S. at 22 (holding that 
maximum resale price maintenance is to be addressed under rule of reason); Dr. Miles 
Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911) (holding that minimum 
resale price maintenance is unlawful per se), overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907 (holding 
that minimum resale price maintenance is addressed under rule of reason). 
20 See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 4 
(1978); Robert H. Bork & Ward Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363, 
375 (1965). 
21 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 
28 J.L. & Econ. 247, 263 (1985) (explaining that antitrust protects inefficiency for the 
benefit of small business); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 314–15 (1981) (stating a similar proposition); Edward A. Snyder & 
Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 
551, 598 (1991) (making a similar argument). 
22 See 388 U.S. at 381–82. 
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beit by reducing prices to consumers.23 The plaintiffs in these cases, 
however, were not “Pop’s Bike and Trike” or “Sally’s Little Shoe Shop.” 
In both cases, as well as other big Supreme Court decisions of this vin-
tage, the plaintiff was the U.S. government.24 The Supreme Court rarely 
did more than give the government what it asked for.25 Yes, the Supreme 
Court did condemn many mergers precisely because they created effi-
ciencies that might injure competitors, but it did so, at least in large 
part, because that is what the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division 
and the Federal Trade Commission wanted.26 
 For example, speaking through Archibald Cox as Solicitor Gen-
eral, the government identified low consumer prices as the primary evil 
brought about by the merger of Brown Shoe and Kinney: 
[T]he integration of manufacturer-retailer Brown with the 
large Kinney retail organization will seriously aggravate the dif-
ficulties that independent retailers are already having in com-
peting with the substantial and ever-expanding retail chains. 
The manufacturer-owned or controlled retail outlet can sell its 
own product at a significantly lower price than the noninte-
grated independent retailer can obtain for a comparable prod-
uct. . . . The conclusion was inevitable that the advantages the 
merged company would have over its smaller retailing competi-
tors would be so great as to threaten to become decisive.27 
Even as early as 1947, in International Salt Co. v. United States, the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted the government’s request to condemn a tying 
arrangement without any showing of either market power in the tying 
product or significant harm in the market for the tied-up salt.28 That is, 
the government showed no injury to competition whatsoever but be-
lieved it was wrong for a patentee to insist that users of its patented ma-
chine also use its own salt, a common commodity not capable of being 
monopolized.29 
                                                                                                                      
23 See 370 U.S. at 346 (addressing a government suit to break up a merger). 
24 See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 367; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 296. 
25 See Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 381–82; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 346. 
26 See Brown Shoe, 388 U.S. at 296; see also Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 580–81 (con-
demning a product-extension merger, a type of conglomerate acquisition, because it would 
lead to economies in marketing that would enable P&G to undersell rivals). See generally 4 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 8, ¶ 905, at 30. 
27 Brief for the United States at 48, Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294 (No. 4). 
28 See 332 U.S. at 401 (accepting government’s argument that power and anticompeti-
tive effects be presumed from existence of a patent). 
29 See id. 
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 As for private plaintiffs, they assuredly have a tendency to push the 
envelope, but in most subsequent private actions they asked the federal 
courts to do no more than give them what had already been given to 
the government.30 For example, the plaintiffs in the 1977 case Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. had simply requested that the lower 
court follow Brown Shoe by protecting their small bowling alley from a 
rival that threatened to become more robust and efficient as a result of 
a merger.31 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit obliged, 
with a detailed analysis of the Brown Shoe decision.32 The court found 
that the main difference in the present case was that the bowling alley 
market in Pueblo, Colorado, was far more concentrated than the shoe 
market in Brown Shoe.33 In reversing, the Supreme Court created the 
“antitrust injury” doctrine, discussed below, which stood the rationale 
of Brown Shoe on its head.34 
 Dating the beginning of antitrust reform is difficult. It may have 
been 1957, when Ward Bowman exploded the traditional leverage the-
ory of tying arrangements, which had suggested that the tying of a mo-
nopoly product to a competitive product could turn one monopoly 
into two.35 Perhaps it was 1958, when John McGee debunked the the-
ory that Standard Oil had engaged in predatory pricing,36 or 1969, 
                                                                                                                      
30 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 480 (1977). 
31 See id. 
32 See NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 269–70 (3d Cir. 1975). 
33 See id. at 270. 
34 See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 480; infra notes 531--543 and accompanying text. 
35 See generally Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale 
L.J. 19 (1957) (debunking notion that tying a monopoly product to a competitive product 
enables a firm to turn one monopoly into two). On the use of the leveraging theory in patent 
misuse cases, see Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474407. For a re-
cent attempt to revitalize the leverage theory, see Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and 
the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397, 400 (2009). For a critique 
showing that the great majority of ties both increase welfare and benefit consumers, see Erik 
N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 Ariz. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1443284. 
36 See John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 
137, 168 (1958) (arguing that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing, but was 
simply more efficient than its rivals). McGee’s work was recently called into question by 
James A. Dalton and Louis Esposito. See James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito, Predatory Price 
Cutting and Standard Oil: A Re-examination of the Trial Record, 22 Res. L. & Econ. 155, 189 
(2007) (re-examining the trial record and finding numerous instances of predation, in 
conflict with McGee’s conclusions); see also Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. 
Rockefeller, Sr. 113–17, 144–47, 202–25, 251–58 (1998) (documenting various rebate 
agreements between Standard Oil and the railroad). 
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when the Neal Report on the antitrust laws was released, provoking a 
sharp reaction that rejected its interventionist recommendations.37 The 
first major signpost of reform may have been in 1975, when Phillip E. 
Areeda and Donald F. Turner published their law review article advo-
cating strict, cost-based standards for predatory pricing,38 or 1978, 
when they published the first three volumes of the Antitrust Law trea-
tise.39 Or maybe it began in 1976, when then-professor Richard A. Pos-
ner published the first edition of his monograph, Antitrust Law,40 or 
1978, when Robert Bork popularized Chicago School ideas in his influ-
ential book, The Antitrust Paradox.41 Perhaps a better candidate is 1981, 
when President Ronald Reagan appointed William F. Baxter as head of 
the Antitrust Division.42 In any event, antitrust reform began largely in 
academic literature and then moved into government enforcement 
and the courts. 
 Today, the antitrust landscape differs so much from the view of 
Brown Shoe that one could barely recognize it from that vantage point. 
The reformation of antitrust involved not only the development of a 
coherent theory of harm related to the underlying goals of the antitrust 
laws, but also a major revision in substance.43 Five years after Brunswick, 
the Supreme Court imposed significant restrictions on antitrust stand-
ing that limit private enforcement to people who suffer demonstrable 
injury as a result of decreased competition.44 In two important deci-
sions twenty years apart, the Court greatly strengthened pleading and 
proof requirements, imposing harsh standards for summary judgment 
                                                                                                                      
37 See White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in Anti-
trust L. & Econ. Rev., Winter 1968–1969, at 11; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neal 
Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, Competition Pol’y Int’l, Spring 2009, at 217 (chroni-
cling harsh reaction to Report that advocated aggressive use of antitrust laws). 
38 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 733 (1975) (advocating restrictive cost-based 
tests for predatory pricing). 
39 See generally Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law (1978) (call-
ing for more restrictive rules for antitrust enforcement, particularly by private plaintiffs). 
40 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 3–7 (1976) 
(making a similar argument). 
41 See generally Bork, supra note 20. 
42 See Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 Int’l 
Rev. L. & Econ. 73, 74 (1985). 
43 See 2A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 335d, at 66–
70 (3d ed. 2007). 
44 See Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 542–44 (1983) (applying a restrictive test for antitrust standing to sue). 
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in its 1986 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. decision45 
and strict pleading standards in its 2007 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
decision.46 In addition, the Supreme Court made exclusionary prac-
tices much more difficult to prove, with holdings on predatory pricing 
in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. in 199347 and 
strict cost-based pricing tests in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hard-
wood Lumber Co. in 2007.48 These rules largely followed the Areeda and 
Turner recommendations of 1975 and 1978. Similarly, in 2004, the Su-
preme Court considerably narrowed the law of unilateral refusals to 
deal by dominant firms.49 It has completely rewritten the law of vertical 
restraints, removing such common law concerns as restraints on alien-
ation, which have nothing to do with competition policy.50 More gener-
ally, the courts have greatly reduced the use of per se rules, with their 
automatic inference of competitive harm, except in cases of naked col-
lusion. Rather, they have required plaintiffs to prove market power and 
anticompetitive effects.51 
II. IP: Reformation That Has Barely Begun 
 IP law today is in a place closely resembling antitrust policy in the 
1960s. As with antitrust, the argument that IP law has become too de-
tached from its central concern with protecting innovation has been 
                                                                                                                      
45 See 475 U.S. 574, 596–97 (1986) (adopting strict standard for summary judgment in 
antitrust case); see also 2 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 
¶ 308, at 133–39 (3d ed. 2007). 
46 See 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (adopting strict standard for pleadings alleging unlaw-
ful antitrust conspiracy); see also 2 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 45, ¶ 307, at 83–84. 
47 See 509 U.S. 209, 222, 223, 224, 232, 243 (1993) (adopting strict rules for predatory 
pricing cases and citing Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 
¶¶ 711, 714, 720c (Supp. 1992)). 
48 See 549 U.S. 312, 325–26 (2007) (adopting strict cost based rules for predator pur-
chasing); see also 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 747, at 
454–55 (3d ed. 2008). 
49 See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
415–16 (2004) (narrowing scope of antitrust law on unilateral refusals to deal); see also 3B 
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 774, at 219 (3d ed. 2008). 
50 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907 (applying rule of reason to resale price maintenance); Ill. 
Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 46 (overruling presumption that patented tying product confers 
sufficient market power to make a tie unlawful); Khan, 522 U.S. at 22 (applying rule of 
reason to maximum price fixing); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 
31–32 (1984) (tightening up standards for tying arrangements); GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 
57 (applying rule of reason to vertical non-price restraints). 
51 See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (adopting lenient rules 
for evaluating price-affecting joint conduct). 
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made in the academic literature and is fully underway.52 Although the 
courts are beginning to respond to these arguments in the area of pat-
ent law, they have yet to do so in the area of copyright law. 
 The articulated goal of IP law is economic, just as it is for antitrust.53 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the “economic philosophy” of 
the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause54 is to “advance public 
welfare” through the patent and copyright systems.55 This is similar to 
saying that the goal of the antitrust law is to advance the public welfare 
by promoting competition.56 Competition and innovation are two 
blades of the same scissors. Traditional competition improves economic 
welfare in the shorter run by keeping markets competitive, which 
means that prices are reasonably close to cost and there are no unnec-
essary restraints on output or entry.57 Innovation policy pursues the 
same welfare goal, but focuses on more “dynamic” concerns, by giving 
people proper incentives to develop new ideas and technologies that 
society will value.58 In both cases consumers are the protected class, be-
cause they are the ones who benefit from lower prices and improved 
products and services.59 
A. The Articulation of Economic Goals 
 Although antitrust rules are more explicitly grounded in economics 
than IP rules are, the latter play at least as important a role in economic 
growth. It has been clear since the work of Joseph Schumpeter, later 
elaborated in Robert W. Solow’s work on the neoclassical growth model, 
that the economic gains from innovation dwarf those from capital accu-
mulation and increased price competition.60 An important but often 
                                                                                                                      
52 See Bohannan, supra note 4, at 969. 
53 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
54 Id. (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
55 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that en-
couragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”). 
56 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 247, 254 
(2007). 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 260 (advocating more aggressive use of antitrust laws against innovation-
reducing restraints). 
59 See id. at 254; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
60 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 83–87 (1942); 
Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. Econ. 65, 65 
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overlooked corollary is that restraints on innovation can do far more 
harm to the economy than restraints on traditional output or pricing.61 
 Nevertheless, the concern with economic welfare is much more 
direct and appears much more frequently in antitrust case law than in 
IP case law. In antitrust cases, courts often state that promoting eco-
nomic welfare through competition is the singular goal.62 One rarely 
sees an appellate antitrust opinion that reaches the merits and does not 
say something about whether the practice under examination under-
mines competition by raising prices above cost, reducing output, injur-
ing consumers, excluding rivals, and the like.63 In fact, the antitrust in-
jury doctrine requires courts to make these determinations in private 
actions.64 Most IP decisions are less explicit. Rather than looking to first 
principles to determine the best way to promote public welfare through 
innovation, courts in IP cases generally focus on interpreting particular 
statutory provisions.65 Although in patent cases the Supreme Court and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit certainly address fun-
damental concerns about innovation incentives more frequently than 
other courts do, they do so mainly in decisions that interpret the rela-
tionship between IP laws and the Constitution.66 In its recent statutory 
decision in Bilski v. Kappos, discussed below, the Supreme Court missed 
an important opportunity for reformation in patent law.67 
 One consequence of the antitrust revolution has been the gradual 
suppression of noneconomic goals. Throughout the history of antitrust 
laws, a number of goals have been articulated for their existence, includ-
ing a guarantee of “fairness” or justice in business practices, the protec-
                                                                                                                      
(1956); Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 3 Rev. 
Econ. & Stat. 312, 320 (1957); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Schumpeterian Competition and 
Antitrust, Competition Pol’y Int’l, Autumn 2008, at 273. 
61 See Hovenkamp, supra note 60, at 273. 
62 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
63 See, e.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
64 See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. 
65 See, e.g., Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
66 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (discussing rele-
vance of Constitution’s IP Clause in the context of nonobviousness requirement in patent 
law); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221–22 (2003) (examining constitutionality of statu-
tory amendment extending copyright term retroactively and considering the intersection 
of the First Amendment and the IP Clause); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 426, 428–29 (1984) (discussing First Amendment and IP Clause); Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6, 37 (1966) (addressing nonobviousness and IP Clause). 
67 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (downplaying fundamental concerns about furthering 
innovation and relying mainly on a parsing of the statute and the precedents); see infra 
notes 353--400 and accompanying text. 
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tion of small business, or some form of populism.68 Today, however, all 
sides of the antitrust debate seem to agree that the antitrust laws are de-
signed to further some version of economic competition.69 To be sure, 
important differences remain. Some prefer an articulation of economic 
competition that maximizes total economic welfare, which is the sum of 
producer and consumer wealth.70 This is the view most consistent with 
that of neoclassical economists generally, whose concern is to maximize 
the size of the pie without regard to how resources are distributed.71 A 
softer variation is “consumer welfare,” which seeks to maximize the size 
of consumers’ surplus.72 Advocates of this view are willing to condemn a 
practice that harms consumers, even though it benefits producers by a 
larger amount.73 The classic example is the merger that results in higher 
consumer prices, but produces an even larger efficiency gain to the 
merging parties. Assuming no one else is affected, such a merger is “ef-
ficient” in the neoclassical sense because total value is increased, and we 
do not care about which party is richer.74 Under the consumer welfare 
argument, however, antitrust law’s protected class is consumers, and we 
are willing to pay the price of some inefficiency in order to protect low 
consumer prices.75 This vision of antitrust is written into the U.S. De-
partment of Justice Merger Guidelines that are in force today, which 
refuse to recognize an “efficiency defense” in merger cases unless the 
efficiency gains are large enough to guarantee that the merger will not 
result in higher consumer prices at all.76 Beyond the consumer welfare 
                                                                                                                      
68 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 69–70 (1982) (describing 
consumer welfare as the most prominent concern of antitrust laws); Louis B. Schwartz, 
“Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1076, 1080–81 (1979) 
(explaining that antitrust is concerned with leveling the playing field between large and 
small business). For evaluations, see also Bork, supra note 20, at 5–8; Herbert Hovenk-
amp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 48–77 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
69 See Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 77. 
70 See Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 
Competition Pol’y Int’l, Autumn 2006, at 1. 
71 See Schumpeter, supra note 60, at 63. 
72 But see Lande, supra note 68, at 84. 
73 See Farrell & Katz, supra note 70, at 3; John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Chi-
cago School’s Foundation is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency, in How the Chi-
cago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on 
U.S. Antitrust 89, 97 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
74 Cf. Schumpeter, supra note 60, at 63. 
75 But see Lande, supra note 68, at 84. 
76 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
§ 4.0, at 31–32 (rev. ed. 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
hmg.pdf (noting that in making a determination of whether to challenge a merger, “the 
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argument, which rarely shows up in litigated cases, the goals of antitrust 
laws are purely economic. 
 One problem with admitting alternative goals is that the resulting 
theory becomes less robust and more susceptible to interest group 
“capture.” Congress is more likely to pass good legislation when goals 
are clearly defined and the path to getting there is relatively clear. 
When goals are divergent, ambiguous, or poorly articulated, Congress 
may have much more difficulty formulating its own vision for how 
things should be. At that point, it could become far more willing to lis-
ten to special interests.77 
 Another problem with noneconomic approaches generally is that 
making them operational is virtually impossible. For example, giving 
serious recognition in antitrust policy to the protection of small busi-
ness might end up condemning every efficient practice that enables 
larger firms to undersell smaller ones. If pursued consistently, such a 
policy could drive us back to the Stone Age, and the theory itself offers 
very little guidance about where to draw the line.78 
 An important difference between antitrust law on the one hand 
and the patent and copyright laws on the other is that antitrust laws are 
passed under the commerce power, whereas the IP provisions are au-
thorized by the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause.79 That fact 
would appear to place a giant thumb on the efficiency side of the scale 
for the IP laws. The Commerce Clause says nothing about encouraging 
competition or efficiency as an exclusive or even an articulated goal.80 
It merely gives Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce.81 At the time the antitrust laws were passed, protection of 
economic efficiency was clearly not foremost on Congress’s mind.82 
More likely, it was the protection of small business.83 Indeed, the Com-
merce Clause has provided the congressional authorization for many 
“fairness” provisions, such as the federal civil rights statutes, as well as 
                                                                                                                      
Agency considers whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the 
merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price 
increases in that market”). 
77 See generally Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 
567 (2006) (explaining special interest “capture”). 
78 See 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 111, at 100–19 
(3d ed. 2006) (discussing alternative goals for antitrust laws and advocating a dominant 
economic approach). 
79 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 8. 
80 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
81 See id. 
82 See 1 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 78, ¶ 111, at 102–03. 
83 See id. 
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statutes that cannot be understood as anything other than favored 
regulatory treatment for specific special interests.84 In sharp contrast, 
the Constitution’s IP Clause expressly articulates a goal of incentivizing 
innovation.85 Indeed, the IP Clause states more strongly than any other 
constitutional provision a goal of furthering economic growth. The 
purpose of patent and copyright legislation is to “promote the progress 
of science and useful arts.”86 To this end, the property rights that these 
provisions create must be valid for only “limited times.”87 That is, their 
purpose is to create incentives to innovate by giving creative people a 
limited period to capture enough of the benefit to incentivize their 
work. When that time has expired, the innovation must be given over 
to the public domain. 
 The Constitution’s purely economic authorization for IP law not-
withstanding, IP writers have produced plenty of noneconomic theories 
that depend on such concepts as natural law, common law property 
rights theory, Hegelian personality theory, and Lockean labor theory, 
among others.88 In general, noneconomic theories seem to be more 
attractive in copyright law89 than in patent law.90 Where copyright law is 
                                                                                                                      
84 Cf., e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006) (addressing workplace discrimination by employ-
ers). 
85 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 137–252 (1988) (dis-
cussing Lockean rights based on labor and individual contribution); Justin Hughes, The 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 330 (1988) (advocating Hegelian theory 
based on primacy of personal autonomy). 
89 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Pho-
tocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 291 (1970) (enumerating and rejecting 
noneconomic goals for copyright); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equal-
ity and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1606 (1993) 
(advocating a modified natural law approach); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s 
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 483, 489 (1996) (defending an allocative effi-
ciency justification); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 
1197, 1197–98 (1996) (critiquing incentives justifications); see also Lior Zemer, The Idea of 
Authorship in Copyright 227–28 (2007); John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of 
Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 465, 507–08 (2005); Lior Zemer, The Making of a 
New Copyright Lockean, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 891, 946–47 (2006) (defending a Lockean 
contribution-of-labor theory); Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law 
Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 Yale L.J. 1179, 1180–81 (2003). 
90 Cf., e.g., Adam D. Moore, Toward a Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, in Intellec-
tual Property 81, 82 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997) (advocating Lockean, labor-driven 
justification); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 31, 51–
52 (1989) (supporting a similar Lockean justification); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and 
Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y. 817, 820 (1990) (describing personality theory); D. B. Resnik, A Pluralistic 
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concerned, noneconomic theory seems to have the upper hand in 
Congress.91 For instance, Congress continuously and retroactively ex-
tends the term of the Copyright Act, with the result that copyright to-
day is of effectively indefinite duration, in two different senses.92 First, it 
appears likely that Congress will keep extending and re-extending the 
duration of the copyright, ensuring that copyrights currently in exis-
tence will never expire. Second, even without further extension, today’s 
copyright term—life of the author plus seventy years—is nearly the 
economic equivalent of indefinite protection.93 The result seems quite 
inconsistent with the mandate of the IP Clause and is more akin to a 
natural rights or property-labor theory that creates permanent private 
property rights to those who have enriched society with their labor. 
B. The Statutory Structure of Antitrust and IP Laws 
 The differing attitudes that antitrust and IP have toward founda-
tional issues are due in part to striking differences between their respec-
tive statutes. The antitrust laws generally condemn restraints on compe-
tition without providing specific instructions about how to achieve un-
derlying goals.94 For example, the Sherman Act, passed in 1890, gives 
little guidance for identifying anticompetitive practices.95 It condemns 
agreements that “restrain trade” and unilateral conduct that “monopo-
lizes,” but neither of these terms is defined in the statute and the word 
“competition” never appears at all.96 This famously led Justice Holmes to 
chastise his colleagues for arguing “as if maintaining competition were 
the expressed object of the Act.”97 In fact, the Sherman Act “says noth-
ing about competition.”98 
                                                                                                                      
Account of Intellectual Property, 46 J. Bus. Ethics 319, 332 (2003) (advocating a multi-faceted 
approach). 
91 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 243, 255–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
92 See id. 
93 See id. (observing that under the Act, the present value of the legislatively created 
term was 99.8% of the value of infinitely long protection making the effective term “virtu-
ally perpetual”); see also Bohannan, supra note 77, at 633–34 (recognizing extent of special 
interest capture in copyright and proposing statutory construction mechanisms for ad-
dressing it). 
94 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, 12–27 (2006); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006). 
95 See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)). 
96 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. 
97 See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting majority’s condemnation of a railroad merger). 
98 Id. 
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 Similarly, in the Clayton Act twenty-four years later, Congress said a 
little more, condemning in very general terms anticompetitive tying, 
exclusive dealing, price discrimination, and mergers.99 But the Clayton 
Act still provides very little detail, stating only that these practices are 
unlawful when they “may . . . substantially lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly . . . .”100 Nothing in the antitrust statutes defines 
competition, says how it may be reduced, or indicates how much reduc-
tion is needed to trigger a violation.101 Nor is there any reference to 
marginal cost pricing or output-maximizing conduct, which have be-
come the predominant baselines for measuring competition.102 Con-
gress apparently did not want to get involved in articulating a specific 
definition of competition or in determining which practices might 
promote or undermine it.103 Rather, it enacted a few general principles 
derived from the common law, and then left it largely to the courts to 
determine what practices violate them.104 
 By contrast, both the Patent Act and the Copyright Act are lengthy 
codes, describing in detail the kinds of rights they create and the reme-
dies that are available to enforce them.105 Patents in particular are the 
subject of heavy regulation, mainly through the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office (the “PTO”).106 
 Why did Congress provide so little detail in the antitrust laws, sim-
ply handing that job over to the courts, but so much in the IP laws? 
One explanation is that the members of Congress were not economists 
or market experts. They did not want to tread in areas where they were 
poorly equipped and could do much more harm than good.107 They 
instead left the federal courts to develop a common law of anticompeti-
                                                                                                                      
99 See Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C §§ 52–53); see also 15 U.S.C. § 13 (addressing price discrimina-
tion); id. § 14 (addressing tying and exclusive dealing); id. § 18 (addressing mergers). 
100 15 U.S.C. § 14; see also id. §§ 13, 18. 
101 See id. §§ 1–7, 12–27. 
102 See id. 
103 See 1 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 78, ¶ 101, at 8–9. 
104 See id. (explaining that the Sherman Act is derived from common law of restraints 
on trade). 
105 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006)); Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006)). 
106 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–42. 
107 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 43–44. 
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tive practices on a case-by-case basis.108 That has largely been the course 
of antitrust policy ever since.109 
 If that is the story for antitrust, however, it should apply even more 
forcefully to IP laws. At every point in our intellectual history we have 
understood and been able to express the technical requirements for 
traditional price and output competition far more satisfactorily than 
the optimum requirements for furthering innovation. 
 Rather, differing levels of detail in the antitrust and IP provisions 
are most likely the result of the relative power of special interests in-
volved in their drafting. The development of patent and copyright legis-
lation has reflected the wishes of patent and copyright holders much 
more than the interests of consumers. For instance, in copyright law, 
Congress has yielded increasingly to interest groups representing mainly 
copyright holders, particularly since passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
sometimes even permitting these interest groups to take over the proc-
ess of statutory drafting.110 Likewise, patent law has proved nearly as sus-
ceptible to special interest influence.111 
 To be sure, special interests have been present in antitrust as well. 
With a few exceptions in the regulated industries, however, they have 
                                                                                                                      
108 See id. at 1–2. 
109 See 1 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 78, ¶ 103, at 62–63. 
110 See Bohannan, supra note 77, at 633 (explaining the extent of special interest cap-
ture in the 1976 Copyright Act); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative 
History, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 857, 862–79 (1987) (describing the magnitude of legislative 
capture in the 1976 Copyright Act); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the 
First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 67–69 (2001) (lamenting continuous expansion 
of protection since 1909 resulting from Congress’s reliance on interested parties to do 
statutory drafting); Sterk, supra note 89, at 1245 (“In the period leading to the 1976 Copy-
right Act, Congress made it clear that industry representatives would have to hammer out 
a bill acceptable to all interest groups.”). 
111 See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–
2000, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2187, 2215–33 (2000) (addressing Congress’s susceptibility to lobby-
ists in the passage of IP statutes); Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and 
Critique, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1017, 1021–23 (2004) (suggesting that lawyers and inven-
tors are interest groups); see also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the 
Patent System, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1341, 1346 (2009) (explaining the influence of special inter-
ests on current patent reform efforts). On earlier patent law, see Andrew P. Morriss & 
Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent 
Law: 1790–1870, at 4 (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. LE07-007, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262970 (addressing the role of interest groups since 
the early constitutional period) and Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of 
Patents 5 (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Paper No. 09-18, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396679 (advocating the common law approach to control for 
capture). See also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the 
Courts Can Solve It 95–100 (2009) (tracing the history of failed congressional efforts to 
reform patent law and capitulation to special interests). 
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appeared much less in the statutory language, which has generally lim-
ited itself to open-ended statements about competition and monopoly.112 
But blaming special interest capture for the differences in the antitrust 
and IP laws is too superficial, for it begs the question of why the IP laws 
have been so much more susceptible to capture than the antitrust laws. 
1. Default Positions 
 Two explanations seem convincing. The first has to do with default 
rules. In the United States, the underlying economics of competition 
policy has always been either classicism or neoclassicism. Under both of 
these schools of economic thought, the default rule was free and open 
market competition.113 Antitrust starts out from the position that mar-
kets generally work well and correct themselves, and that government 
intervention is justified only occasionally.114 When the antitrust laws do 
intervene, they are mainly corrective, in the sense that they are de-
signed to restore a generally unregulated balance that was previously 
upset.115 Even antitrust decrees that are intended to stay in place for a 
long time typically articulate the restoration of competitive conditions 
and their own expiration as a goal.116 
 In sharp contrast, both the Patent Act and the Copyright Act begin 
with the premise—fully justified by the Constitution’s IP Clause—that 
the market operating alone will not produce the optimum amount of 
innovation.117 Indeed, market failure is the starting point for IP laws, 
and it is market failure that gives rise to the need for legal entitle-
ments.118 Without such entitlements, other persons could free ride by 
copying an innovator’s invention or copyrighted work.119 The result 
would be fewer people willing to invest in innovation and creative arts 
                                                                                                                      
112 On the role of special interests in the development of antitrust legislation, see 1 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 78, ¶ 101, at 10–11; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 
20–22; DiLorenzo, supra note 42, at 75–77; Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the 
Antitrust Laws, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1982); George J. Stigler, The Origin of the 
Sherman Act, 14 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1–3 (1985). 
113 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 32, 35, 38. 
114 See id. 
115 Cf. id. at 13–14. 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (per curiam) (explaining that an antitrust remedy decree “must seek to ‘unfetter a 
market from anticompetitive conduct,’ to ‘terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to the 
defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there remain no practices 
likely to result in monopolization in the future’”) (internal citations omitted). 
117 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
118 See Bohannan, supra note 77, at 580. 
119 See id. 
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and, therefore, fewer socially beneficial innovations.120 Thus, govern-
ment action rather than inaction is the default rule; the only question is 
what kind and how much is desirable. That is to say, the IP laws are af-
firmative regulatory provisions, and regulation naturally invites special 
interest participation in questions about the nature and scope of gov-
ernment intervention.121 
2. Lack of Theoretical Robustness 
 A second reason that special interests have had more traction in IP 
than in antitrust has to do with the relative robustness of the doctrines’ 
competition and innovation models. The history of competition and 
innovation policy shows more consensus about the nature of traditional 
competition than about the nature of innovation.122 The point can be 
pushed too far, and there is always plenty of dissent along the margins, 
but the principle is a strong one nonetheless. Competition requires ri-
valry among firms in the same market and free entry into the market.123 
We can debate endlessly about how many firms it takes to make a mar-
ket perform competitively, or about adjustments for product differentia-
tion, or high fixed costs or informational imbalances, but the basic out-
line of the requirements for competition have been well known for 
more than a century and claim a broad professional and policy consen-
sus.124 
 When we ask instead what government policy will encourage the 
optimum amount of innovation, the answers become far less determi-
nate and go much more to the extremes. To this day, the economics of 
innovation has no equivalent to formulations such as the robust, broadly 
applied neoclassical rule that under perfect competition price equals 
marginal cost.125 To be sure, there are always complicated tradeoffs. For 
example, in antitrust, we continually compare the dominant firm’s need 
to expand aggressively against the resulting harm to rivals, speculating 
about the long-run impact on consumers.126 But the tradeoffs in IP law 
                                                                                                                      
120 See id. 
121 See id. at 633. 
122 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. Pol. 
Econ. 1, 1 (1957). 
123 See id. at 2. 
124 See generally id. (tracing development of robust neoclassical model of perfect com-
petition). 
125 See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 89, at 517 n.140 (noting that where markets for innova-
tion are not perfectly competitive, producers are able to charge more than the marginal 
costs). 
126 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 13–14. 
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are much more extreme and difficult to measure. No one knows what 
the optimal duration of patent or copyright protection should be, or 
whether there should be different periods of protection in different ar-
eas of enterprise. Some even doubt whether we need any protection at 
all.127 Although the patent term (twenty years from filing of the patent 
application) is much shorter than the copyright term, it may still be far 
too long in areas such as computer technology, where inventions be-
come obsolete in the marketplace long before their patents expire and 
long terms contribute to innovation-stifling thickets.128 On the other 
hand, the patent term might be too short in areas such as pharmaceuti-
cals, where shelf lives are very long, copying is relatively easy, and inno-
vation costs are very high in relation to annualized payoffs.129 Nor are 
there robust models for explaining the proper scope of patent claims, 
the optimal amount of fair use in copyright, and the like.130 
 About the best we can say is that the primary goal of IP policy 
should be to maximize net gains from innovation after all transaction 
costs have been paid. As such, it must balance the incentive value of 
exclusion against that of access to the developed technology and ideas 
of others.131 This may or may not require different decisions about pat-
                                                                                                                      
127 See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly 
137, 243 (2008) (arguing for abolition of IP laws and claiming that first mover advantages 
are sufficient to facilitate most worthwhile innovation); Breyer, supra note 89, at 291 (find-
ing very weak case for copyright). 
128 See Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives 117 (2006) (explaining that 
single term in all markets rewards some industries too much while rewarding others too 
little). 
129See id.; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 1155, 1205–06 (2002) (making a similar argument). 
130 See Andrew F. Christie & Fiona Rotstein, Duration of Patent Protection: Does One Size Fit 
All?, 3 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 402, 404–05 (2008); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Opti-
mal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 Rand J. Econ. 106, 111–12 (1990). See generally William D. 
Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Techno-
logical Change (1969) (examining diverse factors in various industries that affect value of 
patent protection and producing formulas for optimal patent duration); F. M. Scherer, Nord-
haus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 422 (1972) 
(interpreting Nordhaus). On copyright, see Yuehong Yuan & Stephen F. Roehrig, On the 
Duration of Copyright Protection for Digital Information, in The Internet and Telecommunica-
tions Policy 247, 267–69 (Gerald W. Brock & Gregory L. Rosston eds., 1996) (examining 
the possibility of differential duration for digital and more traditional works). 
131 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of In-
tellectual Property Law 11 (2003). 
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ent term and scope in different industries.132 Today the consensus is 
fairly broad that our laws provide too much protection.133 
 In general, the influence of special interests depends on the rela-
tive robustness of the model under which democratic policymakers 
work.134 When a model is robust and obtains broad consensus, the in-
fluence of special interests tends to be minimized.135 For example, the 
pricing of both groceries and retail electricity are left to the states, 
which means that numerous jurisdictions could intervene in either or 
both markets. Yet grocery prices are set by the market virtually every-
where, whereas retail electricity prices are regulated by government 
agencies virtually everywhere.136 Surely this is not because the electric 
industry has better lobbyists than the grocery trade or its special inter-
ests are better organized in every state. The explanation is a much 
more obvious one. Most markets have many grocery stores. For the 
most part, they sell commodities, and entry is easy.137 Accordingly, gro-
cery retailing fits the economic model for competition rather robustly. 
At the other end of the spectrum, retail electricity fits the economic 
model for a natural monopoly. We know that electricity is most effi-
ciently delivered to houses by a single firm, which requires price regula-
tion.138 Thus, although the grocery and electricity markets are very dif-
ferent, there is broad agreement on the appropriate economic model 
and policy for each market. That consensus, more than special interest 
capture, explains why there is regulation in one market and not in the 
other. 
                                                                                                                      
132 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 111, at 95; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1615 (2003). 
133 See Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership 
Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives 2 (2008); Lawrence Lessig, Free 
Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture 
and Central Creativity 292 (2004). Even relative conservatives such as Landes and 
Posner agree that our laws provide too much protection. See Landes & Posner, supra note 
131, at 36. 
134 See Bohannan, supra note 77, at 572. 
135 Cf. id. 
136 Compare FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc, 548 F.3d 1028, 1032, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(examining the “premium, natural, or organic supermarkets” industry and distinguishing 
such supermarkets from ordinary grocery stores), with Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973) (describing franchises granted to a power company by 
municipalities). 
137 See, e.g., Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1032, 1033 (reversing a district court finding that a 
premium organic supermarket competed within the broader market of grocery stores). 
138 See, e.g., Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 369 (“Each town in [electric company’s] service area gener-
ally can accommodate only one distribution system, making each town a natural monopoly market 
. . . .”). 
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 By contrast, when an area of enterprise is not well understood, 
lawmakers are more vulnerable to special interests.139 That is clearly the 
case in patent and copyright law.140 Either there is no factually “right 
answer” to problematic questions about the duration and scope of IP 
rights or, more likely, the answers are very complex and may vary con-
siderably from one market to the next. Indeed, there is probably more 
variation in the right approach than could ever be accounted for by a 
single model. Lacking any consensus resembling the neoclassical vision 
of price competition, Congress simply listens to those who speak with 
the most persuasive voices.141 The classic public choice paradigm clearly 
favors IP rights holders: they are fewer in number, have individually 
greater stakes, and typically have interests that are much more ho-
mogenous.142 On the other side, the users of IP rights tend to be more 
numerous and heterogeneous.143 Because of this disparity, IP rights 
holders are better organized than IP users and, therefore, are able to 
communicate their wishes to Congress more effectively.144 
 As a result of special interest capture, the IP laws as enacted have 
become much more disconnected from their purpose, which is opti-
mum promotion of innovation.145 At the same time, some recent judi-
cial decisions and pending patent reform legislation show that patent 
reform has seriously begun.146 The outlook for copyright law is bleaker. 
Despite voluminous scholarly commentary and powerful arguments for 
reform, there is little evidence today that copyright law is ready to take 
that journey.147 
III. The Beginnings of Patent Reform 
 As several commentators have ably observed, the patent system is 
currently so beset with problems that it arguably does more harm to 
                                                                                                                      
139 See Bohannan, supra note 77, at 572 (explaining generally how lawmakers are influ-
enced). 
140 See id. at 568. 
141 See id. at 568, 572. 
142 See id. at 581–82 (showing how copyright law bears the hallmark characteristics of 
special interest legislation). 
143 See id. 
144 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical 
Introduction 20 (1991); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III 473 (2003); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 63, 88 (1990). 
145 See Bohannan, supra note 77, at 582. 
146 See infra notes 148--440 and accompanying text. 
147 See infra notes 441--496 and accompanying text. 
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innovation than good.148 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley suggest that the 
consensus for stronger patent protection, which led to the creation of 
the Federal Circuit in 1982, with its broad appellate jurisdiction over 
cases arising under the Patent Act, has now “broken down.”149 Today we 
have gone to the opposite extreme. First, we have created a system that 
issues too many patents, many of which are only trivial improvements 
over prior art. Innovation would be better served if these “inventions” 
were left in the public domain. Second, patents have unclear bounda-
ries, and the patent notice system does not enable innovators to know 
with confidence when they are treading on another’s property rights.150 
Third, the patent system lacks clear rules about priority of rights.151 As a 
result, developers often discover that they are infringers only after they 
have made significant, irreversible investments.152 Paying to get out of 
such a predicament often costs far more than avoiding it in the first 
place. In many areas of enterprise, then, the private costs of the patent 
system outweigh any private gains, and market participants would be 
better off if the system did not exist.153 Fourth, the patent system, like 
the copyright system, has lacked a serious harm requirement as an ele-
ment of infringement.154 As a result, the rights it creates are often not 
related in any coherent way to the underlying goal of the system, which 
is to encourage the optimal amount of innovation.155 An infringement 
that does not cause foreseeable harm to the patentee cannot be said to 
reduce the incentive to invent.156 
                                                                                                                      
148 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureau-
crats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 46–47 (2008); Burk & Lemley, supra note 
111, at 3. 
149 Burk & Lemley, supra note 111, at 3. On the creation of the Federal Circuit and 
the controversy surrounding it, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case 
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3–5 (1989) and Paul M. Janicke, To Be or Not 
to Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (1887–1992), 69 An-
titrust L.J. 645, 645–47 (2002). On the court’s impact in strengthening patent protec-
tion, see Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. Legal Stud. 85, 114–15 (2006). 
150 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 148, at 47. 
151 Cf. id. at 200. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. at 46–47; see also Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the 
U.S. Patent System: Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 989, 992–94 
(2004) (examining the economic cost of excessive, weak patents). 
154 See Bohannan, supra note 4, at 1031. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
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A. The Patent-Antitrust Conflict 
 These problems in the patent system can have severely detrimental 
effects on innovation and competition. Consider how patent law’s own 
internal problems interfere with antitrust law’s purpose of promoting 
economic growth through innovation and competition.157 Antitrust law 
today enjoys the comparative advantage of well-behaved statutory lan-
guage and doctrine.158 Although significant conflicts exist between anti-
trust and patent policy, most of these result from defects in the patent 
law system rather than in antitrust. We consider three examples: im-
properly brought IP infringement suits;159 extreme judicial deference to 
patent settlements;160 and patent continuations and holdup problems.161 
1. Post-Issuance Conduct: Improper Infringement Actions 
 The antitrust law of unreasonably exclusionary infringement ac-
tions is relatively clear. If an IP holder either has or threatens to have 
substantial market power and brings an objectively “baseless” infringe-
ment suit, then the lawsuit is deemed anticompetitive and can violate 
section 2 of the Sherman Act.162 Although the cases can arise under 
both patent and copyright, most are patent infringement suits.163 The 
cases typically arise when an infringement defendant counterclaims 
that the patentee brought suit on an invalid or unenforceable patent, 
or under circumstances where no reasonable person would have an-
ticipated success if the true facts were known.164 For example, the pat-
ent might be unenforceable because it was obtained by fraud or inequi-
table conduct before the PTO, or perhaps the patentee should have 
known that the defendant’s technology did not infringe.165 
                                                                                                                      
157 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 148, at 200. 
158 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 1. 
159 See infra notes 162--201. 
160 See infra notes 202--206. 
161 See infra notes 207--260. 
162 See 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 48, ¶ 706, at 161. 
163 See generally Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 
U.S. 49 (1993) (leading copyright case); Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & 
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (leading patent case); 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra 
note 48, ¶ 705, at 156–57. 
164 See, e.g., Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174. 
165 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). At this writing the Federal Circuit may be on the verge of rewriting the rules for 
inequitable conduct in procurement. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co. 
(Therasense I ), 593 F.3d 1289, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding inequitable conduct for fail-
ure to disclose statements made to a European Patent Office about prior art), vacated and 
rehearing en banc granted, (Therasense II ), Nos. 2008-1511, 2008-1512, 2008-1513, 2008-1514, 
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 Although the case for competitive harm from improper infringe-
ment actions is strong, uncertainty and confusion in patent law often 
undermine these antitrust claims. All too often no one knows what are 
the boundaries of a patent. As a result, it is often impossible to say that 
no reasonable person would have brought a particular infringement 
suit to enforce a patent.166 
 Further, the problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Federal 
Circuit itself is willing to overlook fairly outrageous patent assertions. In 
its 2007 decision, Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, for example, the court re-
fused to impose antitrust liability on a patentee who obtained a patent 
by deceiving the PTO.167 The court acknowledged that the patent appli-
cant knowingly lied in a sworn statement that there had been no sales 
more than one year prior to the application.168 In fact, some 800 such 
sales had occurred.169 That such sales would have rendered the product 
unpatentable was indisputable because of the statutory on-sale bar.170 
The Federal Circuit held that although the omission rendered the pat-
ent unenforceable, it was insufficient to create antitrust liability.171 
 There are two ways in which the court’s decision makes it easier for 
patent holders to restrain innovation and competition. First, the court 
required at least two independent pieces of information showing intent 
                                                                                                                      
2008-1595, 2010 WL 1655391 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2010). In granting the rehearing en banc, 
the court asked the parties to brief the question of whether existing standards balancing 
materiality and intent should be modified or replaced. Therasense II, 2010 WL 1655391, at 
*1. 
166 On the unacceptably high rate of reversals and Federal Circuit dissents in claim 
construction decisions, see Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim 
Construction, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 177, 182 (2005) and John R. Thomas, Claim Re-
Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 
153, 163 (2005). 
167 476 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
168 See id. at 1345–46, 1349. 
169 See id. at 1347. 
170 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (barring patentability of product placed on the mar-
ket more than one year prior to filing of the patent application). 
171 See Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346 (citing Paragon Podiatry Lab, Inc. v. KLM Lab, 
Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The court explained that: 
Absent explanation, the evidence of a knowing failure to disclose sales that 
bear all the earmarks of commercialization reasonably supports an inference 
that the inventor’s attorney intended to mislead the PTO. The concealment 
of sales information can be particularly egregious because, unlike the appli-
cant’s failure to disclose, for example, a material patent reference, the exam-
iner has no way of securing the information on his own. 
Id. 
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to deceive the PTO.172 It found only one, the omitted sales them-
selves.173 The offending sales occurred in 1987, but the subsequent in-
fringement suit was filed in 2000, some thirteen years later.174 Because 
proving fraud would require investigation into facts that occurred thir-
teen years before the suit was filed, such a requirement hinders parties 
seeking to prove anticompetitive uses in patent infringement suits.175 
 Second, the court’s decision failed to consider the patent holder’s 
anticompetitive conduct in filing the infringement suit itself.176 The 
court reasoned that because antitrust penalties are far more severe 
than invalidating the patent, a single knowing misstatement was not 
sufficiently bad conduct to support an antitrust counterclaim.177 But 
the Federal Circuit overlooked the fact that there was in fact much 
more. Not only had the patentee lied to the PTO, but more than a dec-
ade later, after the PTO had closed its book on this patent and prior 
sales had become very difficult to trace, the patentee filed a patent in-
fringement claim.178 Thus, the Federal Circuit had the two independ-
ent pieces of evidence of fraudulent conduct that it required; it simply 
neglected to look at the post-issuance period when the infringement 
action was filed.179 That conduct is especially important because the 
PTO no longer effectively regulates patentee conduct once a patent is 
issued. As such, the conduct is not subject to regulatory supervision 
and must be considered fair game under the antitrust laws.180 
 When thinking about Patent Act and antitrust remedies for im-
proper infringement activities, one must distinguish pre-issuance and 
post-issuance conduct.181 The patent application process is heavily regu-
lated, but after a patent is issued, PTO regulation is minimal.182 Fun-
                                                                                                                      
172 See id. at 1345–46. 
173 See id. at 1347. 
174 See In re Dippin’ Dots Patent Litig., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1353–54 (N.D. Ga. 2003) 
(explaining that offending sales occurred in 1987); cf. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Inno-
vations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1062, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (determining that antitrust liabil-
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the patent application deleted the reference to the book). 
175 See Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1348. 
176 See id. at 1349. 
177 See id. at 1348–49. 
178 See id. at 1340, 1341. 
179 See id. at 1344–45. 
180 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Patents, Property, and Competition Policy, 34 J. Corp. L. 1243, 
1243 (2009) (addressing the patent system as a regulatory regime). 
181 See id. at 1243–44. 
182 Id. 
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damentally, the Walker Process doctrine—from the Supreme Court’s 
1965 decision in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & 
Chemical Corp.—is about post-issuance conduct.183 Walker Process held that 
a firm might violate the antitrust laws by filing an infringement suit 
based on an invalid patent if the patent had been obtained through 
false representations on the patent application. Thus, the antitrust vio-
lation concerns post-issuance conduct, such as the filing of an in-
fringement action, the threat to file such an action, or threats to cus-
tomers or other business relations.184 All of these can occur many years 
after a patent has been issued. Antitrust law should stand aside when a 
government agency is an active regulator, but not when economic deci-
sion making is left entirely in private hands. As a result, antitrust right-
fully has a place when the anticompetitive conduct occurs subsequent 
to patent issuance.185 
 The remedy of unenforceability, which the patent system itself ad-
ministers against falsified applications, is designed to protect the integ-
rity of the patent issuance process. Patents have a certain exclusionary 
force even if they are never enforced.186 For example, a firm contem-
plating product development in ice cream might do a patent search, 
discover the Dippin’ Dots patent, and then abandon its development 
efforts.187 There may be no correspondence whatsoever with the pat-
entee. The result is reduced competition in a market that would have 
been more competitive had the invalidity of the patent been known.188 
The antitrust laws are most likely to be invoked when another person 
has independently developed the technology or rightfully believed it to 
be in the public domain. Now the patentee can brandish the patent as 
a market exclusion device.189 This is likely to happen during the post-
issuance period, when there is no oversight from the PTO.190 
 The Dippin’ Dots case also gives us a perspective on the kinds of 
improper infringement actions that are most problematic.191 A patent 
applicant’s sales of the patented product prior to the application are 
                                                                                                                      
183 See 382 U.S. at 173–74. 
184 See id. 
185 Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 180, at 1243–44. 
186 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 148, at 33. 
187 A wide variety of exclusionary conduct falls short of actual infringement suits or 
threats to sue. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 Ind. L.J. 133 (2008). 
188 See id. at 135–36. 
189 See id. 
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frequently undocumented and difficult to uncover.192 It is one thing to 
file a patent infringement suit on a patent that is reasonably subject to 
dispute on the basis of public information—for example, where there is 
a legal dispute about patentable subject matter or claim construc-
tion.193 Both the patentee and the infringer have the same access to 
relevant information, so this amounts to a “title dispute” over the mean-
ing of the public record. 
 Consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Professional 
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., which in-
volved a disputed question of law.194 Columbia Pictures owned the 
copyrights on certain recorded movies that Professional Real Estate 
(“PRE”), a hotel operator, permitted guests to play in their rooms for a 
fee.195 The lower courts were divided on the question of whether paid 
viewing of a movie in a hotel room constituted a “public” performance, 
which was a right retained by Columbia Pictures.196 Thus, under the 
broader version of the law, Columbia Pictures had a right to enjoin or 
collect royalties for paid viewing of its recorded films.197 The Supreme 
Court held that an infringement action was not improper simply be-
cause the lower courts disagreed with each other about the copyright 
holder’s rights and the plaintiff chose one interpretation over the 
other.198 
 Fraudulent failure to disclose prior sales does not ordinarily ap-
pear in the record, however, and sales made by the patentee itself thir-
teen years earlier are unlikely to show up at all.199 The reason enforce-
ment actions such as the one in Dippin’ Dots are so dangerous is that 
prior sales are likely to be known only by the patent applicant and dis-
covered by the infringement defendant only as a matter of luck. Con-
tinuing the analogy to real property, lying about prior sales is more like 
                                                                                                                      
192 See id. 
193 See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (examining a disputed claim construction over the word “wound” and 
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forgery of a signature on a deed. Such a deed fails to pass any title, but 
the forgery itself cannot be detected by a title search.200 
 Antitrust challenges to patent infringement suits, to the threat of 
such suits, or to related exclusionary conduct should be analyzed as of 
the time the suit is brought or the threat is made. At that point, the 
question is whether a reasonable patent owner aware of the entire re-
cord should have known that the patent was unenforceable under the 
circumstances. If the answer to that question is yes, then the “conduct” 
element of a monopolization offense has been established. Sometimes 
making this assessment will involve some analysis of how serious any 
misconduct before the PTO was and whether the misconduct was “ma-
terial,”201 in the sense that the patent would not have issued (or would 
have been narrower) but for the misconduct. In all cases, however, the 
question is what a reasonable patent owner would have believed. 
2. Judicial Deference to IP Settlements 
 Another area in which patent law enables patentees to restrain 
competition and innovation involves judicial deference to patent and 
other IP settlements. Courts have been extremely deferential to settling 
parties, even to the point of tolerating naked antitrust restraints.202 For 
example, in the so-called “exit payment” cases in the pharmaceutical 
market, courts have upheld a drug patent holder’s payments to another 
pharmaceutical company for that company’s agreement not to make 
and market a generic version of the drug.203 
                                                                                                                      
200 See, e.g., Erier v. Creative Fin. & Inv., LLC, 203 P.3d 744, 750 (Mont. 2009) (“A 
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v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding no violation); Michael A. Carrier, 
Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Prop-
erty and Antitrust Law 293 (2009) (advocating presumptive illegality); C. Scott Hemp-
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 This deferential attitude toward anticompetitive patent settlements 
may reflect judges’ eagerness to encourage parties to resolve their dis-
putes privately.204 But clearly that is not a complete answer. The real 
source of the problem is the complete indeterminacy that the patent 
system creates with respect to ownership and priority of patent rights. To 
illustrate, consider how antitrust law would apply to “exit payments” in-
volving real property, where ownership rights are much clearer. Suppose 
Alpha owns an urban parcel of land with a working gasoline station. 
When Beta begins constructing a competing gasoline station across the 
street, Alpha files a trespass action against Beta even though Alpha has 
no title or possessory claim to the land on which Beta is building. The 
parties then “settle” the dispute by agreeing that Alpha will make “exit 
payments” to Beta, giving it $1000 per month in exchange for aban-
donment of its construction plans. 
 No court would think twice about investigating the land title re-
cords, determining that there was no property dispute here, and con-
cluding that the whole charade was a cover for unlawful collusion. The 
difference in the pharmaceutical situation has nothing to do with any 
kind of deference to settlements generally. Rather, the reason is that the 
state of the “title records” in patent law is so abysmal that courts are in-
clined to defer to the parties’ judgments about them. If patent bounda-
ries were clearer, we would almost certainly have many fewer anticom-
petitive settlement agreements. 
 As James Bessen and Michael Meurer observe, patent law is fraught 
with problems of fuzzy boundaries, overly broad claims, retroactive as-
sertions of interest, and serious questions about validity that make the 
patent system a completely unreliable guide to the proper state of pat-
ent rights.205 These problems and uncertainties, rather than any judicial 
preference for settlements, drive the extreme deference toward anti-
competitive patent settlements.206 
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3. Priority, Holdup, and Disclosure Obligations 
 Finally, there are the problems of late patent claims and holdups, 
some of which the PTO has attempted to address, although thus far 
without much success.207 Much of the problem of priority and holdup 
in the patent system results from “late claiming,” or patent claims that 
are submitted to the PTO and approved subsequent to the filing of the 
original application.208 By statute, patent protection begins as of the 
date the application is filed, so late claiming can create property rights 
that are “retroactive,” in the sense that the public record first provides 
evidence of the right much later than the right is acknowledged for in-
fringement purposes.209 Late claiming can lead to assertions of patent 
rights over third parties whose technological development actually pre-
ceded approval and publication of the claim that they have allegedly 
infringed. These parties become infringers even though they could not 
have had notice of the patent claims at the time of their own invest-
ment. As many as seventy percent of issued patents now claim priority 
to at least one previously filed patent application by virtue of backdated 
enforceability to the time of filing.210 The impact of this practice can be 
catastrophic. Prospectively, a licensee will be willing to pay the incre-
mental value of an invention in light of competitive alternatives, and 
that is the invention’s efficient value.211 Retrospectively, however, if the 
potential licensee has already built a factory or made another substan-
tial commitment to the patentee’s technology without knowledge of the 
prior claim, the patentee can appropriate the additional value up to the 
cost of switching to a different technology.212 This gives late claims a 
strategic value at the expense of innovation.213 
 The “claims” in a patent are individual statements that set out the 
boundaries for determining what constitutes infringement.214 Using the 
real property deed as an analogy, the written description in a patent is 
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214 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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like the general description given in the granting clause of the deed, 
such as “Blackacre,” or “the farm at Route 2, Box 192, Celery Center 
Road.” The written description was historically designed to demon-
strate that the patentee was in “possession” of the invention, in the 
sense that he had all technical knowledge necessary to produce it and 
make it operational.215 Just like the real property deed, however, the 
patent must also include a precise statement that will enable a skilled 
professional to know with some accuracy where the boundaries are lo-
cated. In a deed this could be a “metes and bounds” description by ref-
erence to compass courses and distances, or it could be a reference to a 
survey map and to surveyors’ pins that are driven into the ground 
along the property lines.216 
 The written description in a patent typically describes the history of 
the art prior to this patent, the problems that the patent addresses, and 
the overall nature of the invention in sufficient detail that a person 
skilled in the art could replicate it without too much experimenta-
tion.217 The Federal Circuit recently reiterated that a separate written 
description is an essential part of a patent application.218 In describing 
the entire invention, the written description will very likely refer to 
things that are already in the prior art, and thus not covered by this par-
ticular patent, as well as the new inventive steps that the invention in-
cludes, often without distinguishing the two. The “enablement” re-
quirement virtually guarantees this mixture. For example, if a device 
contains ten components, a sufficiently enabled written description 
would ordinarily have to describe all ten of them, with instructions as to 
how they work together. It may be the case, however, that only three of 
the components are novel, and the inventor is claiming only these as the 
                                                                                                                      
215 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. Rev. 123, 175 (2006) 
(discussing diverse meanings of requirement that patent applicant be in “possession” of 
the invention). 
216 See id. 
217 See 35 U.S.C. § 112. For a patent to be valid, the law requires the following: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of 
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, 
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . . 
Id. 
218 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (conclud-
ing that the written description requirement is not satisfied by showing enablement); see 
Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 Yale L.J. Online 127 
(2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/03/09/risch.html (showing independent rele-
vance of written description requirement beyond enablement). 
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invention.219 The claims would then identify these three components as 
the things that this particular patentee is claiming as novel, and for 
which an exclusive right is sought.220 As the Supreme Court has ob-
served, the purpose of claims is to “inform the public . . . of the limits of 
the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be 
safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not.”221 
 To illustrate from a well-known patent validity decision, a patent 
on a mechanical device for permitting a sectional sofa to have parallel, 
independent reclining seats contained a written description of “a sec-
tional sofa arrangement that includes a double reclining seat sofa sec-
tion,” and a console between the seats that “includes a table top.”222 
The inventor was not claiming to have invented a “sectional sofa,” how-
ever, nor a sofa with “double reclining seats,” nor the idea of a console 
that can be used as a table top.223 All of these things had been invented 
before by others. Rather, the invention was limited to the mechanical 
apparatus that enabled the individual seats on the sofa to be reclined by 
the use of push buttons mounted on the console.224 But someone read-
ing the written description alone would not be able to tell which parts 
of the described invention were new, and thus patentable, and which 
parts were already a part of the prior art. This particular patent then 
went on to enumerate twenty-one separate claims, or what were in-
tended to be statements of those elements of the described sofa that 
the patentee was claiming as his invention.225 
                                                                                                                      
219 Cf. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822) (explaining that the patent’s 
written description “mix[ed] up the new and old” such that one could not tell which part 
of the described machine was new and which was not, and asking, “How can that be a suf-
ficient specification of an improvement in a machine, which does not distinguish what the 
improvement is, nor state in what it consists, nor how far the invention extends?”). On the 
importance of this decision in creating the necessity of independent claims, see Chiang, 
supra note 207, at 540–41, and also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation 
Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 49, 65 (2005) (ex-
plaining the importance of patents in determining what an invention actually is). 
220 On the centrality of claims to the determination of patent scope, see John F. Duffy, 
On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 Wash. U. 
J.L. & Pol’y 109, 109 (2000) and Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim 
Terms, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 101 (2005). 
221 Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931); see also Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373–75 (1996) (describing centrality of patent claims). 
222 U.S. Patent No. 5,064,244 (filed Jan. 3, 1991) (issued Nov. 12, 1991). 
223 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 See Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1475, 1479–80 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (concluding that many of the claims were not supported by the written description 
portion of the specification); see also White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886) (stating that 
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 The fact that the written description in a patent does not itself 
provide adequate notice of patent boundaries is further evidenced by 
the treatment of “omnibus” claims. Having written a sufficient descrip-
tion, the applicant might be tempted to write a claim such as: “I claim 
whatever is enabled and described by the specification [including the 
written description], and that is not made obvious by the prior art.”226 
But such claims are largely useless because they simply put to the 
searcher the duty to conduct her own search through the prior art to 
determine what is obvious and what is not.227 They also create the prob-
lem of too much information because properly enabled written de-
scriptions are often very detailed, providing a flood of technical detail, 
only a small portion of which constitutes the invention.228 
 Deeds and patents differ from one another in several respects. 
Deeds and their descriptions are ordinarily drafted by lawyers, perhaps 
with the aid of a surveyor’s description. Their language is not approved 
by any regulatory agency, and the clerk in the recorder’s office rarely 
does more than ascertain that the deed is not missing obvious ele-
ments, such as the grantor’s signature.229 She certainly does not review 
the document to make sure that the description is accurate or, in most 
cases, even sensible.230 Further, she does not do a title search to deter-
mine that the description is consistent with the grantor’s record title, 
which is the recording system’s equivalent of “prior art.” Deed descrip-
tions can be litigated, however, and generally a deed description that 
does not describe the conveyed land with sufficient accuracy such that a 
reasonably knowledgeable person can identify its boundaries fails to 
pass any title whatsoever.231 This approach creates a very powerful de-
                                                                                                                      
claims force patentee to “define precisely what his invention is”); Burk & Lemley, supra 
note 111, at 11–13 (describing claiming process). 
226 See Chiang, supra note 207, at 538. 
227 See Ex parte Fressola, No. 93-0828, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1613, 1614 (B.P.A.I. 1993) 
(rejecting omnibus claim because it placed upon searcher the obligation to distinguish 
what was in the prior art from what was novel); John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims 
According to Their “Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 321, 350 (2008) (describing an omnibus claim as a “frank but unhelp-
ful generality”). 
228 See Golden, supra note 227, at 350. 
229 See, e.g., Erier, 203 P.3d at 747. 
230 Cf. id. 
231 See, e.g., In re Poteat, 176 B.R. 734, 740 (Bankr. D. Del. 1995) (explaining that an in-
adequate description rendered mortgage deed invalid, and it did not matter that trustee 
could have determined proper description by examining land title records for prior con-
veyances of same parcel); Mitchell v. Thomas, 467 So. 2d 326, 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985) (stating that the description failed to locate two property lines). A narrow exception 
exists for clear mistakes, such as where the drafter of the deed described a different parcel 
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fault rule: the drafter of the deed must get it right the first time. The 
price of not getting it right is an invalid deed. This default rule also 
makes the deed a remarkably accurate device for describing property 
ownership, and in the vast majority of cases a trained professional can 
look at a deed and have little difficulty in determining the property’s 
boundaries. 
 The patent process works much differently. Patent claims are usu-
ally, but not always, drafted by lawyers. The patent applicant offers a 
written description with sufficient enablement that someone skilled in 
the art can replicate the invention, and a set of claims that are intended 
to be as broad as can reasonably be asserted, with ambiguities generally 
resolved in favor of enforceability.232 The patent examiner then begins 
a review process that tests the individual claims against both the written 
description and the prior art.233 A particular claim might fail because 
this particular item was already established in the prior art, or it might 
fail because the claim went beyond that which the written description 
included—that is, because it covered something that was not shown to 
be a part of the proposed invention.234 
 Many priority problems arise because the current system gives the 
patentee virtually unlimited bites at the apple. If one or more claims in 
the original patent are rejected, the patentee may file a “continuation” 
application that asserts new or additional claims.235 Further, because 
the effective validity date of a patent is the date that the original appli-
cation was filed, such “after claiming,” or “late claiming,” can result in a 
patent that is effective from, for example, July, 2005, even though the 
precise claim that ends up being infringed was drafted much later and 
approved even later still.236 
 The patent system does not provide adequate incentives to appli-
cants to propose clear claims in a timely fashion.237 As Tun-Jen Chiang 
                                                                                                                      
than the one the parties agree upon. In such cases the court will admit parol evidence and 
reform the deed if necessary. See, e.g., Drake v. Hance, 673 S.E.2d 411, 413 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2009). 
232 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
233 See generally U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (rev. ed. 2010) (establishing patent review procedures). 
234 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 131 (2006). 
235 See Paul M. Janicke, When Patents Are Broadened Midstream: A Compromise Solution to 
Protect Competitors and Existing Users, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 7, 26–27 (1997). 
236 See id. 
237 The lack of proper incentives to draft clear claims is suggested by the high reversal 
rate: the Federal Circuit reverses district court claim constructions in more than a third of 
appealed cases. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction 
More Predictable?, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 231, 233, 239 (2005). 
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has observed, claims that are included in the original patent applica-
tion are likely to be more “honest” than late-filed claims, which give the 
patentee the opportunity to add things not foreseen when the original 
application was filed or, worse yet, to hijack the inventions of third par-
ties whose work the applicant did not anticipate.238 Patent law should 
strive for the position that never finds liability for infringement against 
technology that was deployed prior to the time that the infringement-
producing claim was approved and of which the public was adequately 
notified. 
 Cases such as Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, decided in 2008 by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arise because it is too easy for 
patentees surreptitiously to file retroactively enforceable continuation 
applications on the technology of rivals.239 Rambus had a patent appli-
cation in process that had been filed in 1990.240 It subsequently partici-
pated in standard-setting talks while surreptitiously filing patent con-
tinuation applications that added new claims covering the very stan-
dards that the standard-setting organization was promulgating.241 These 
claims then related back to the original 1990 application for priority 
purposes.242 Then, three years later, after firms had committed to and 
implemented the standardized technology, Rambus asserted its patent 
and demanded royalties.243 Rambus was then able to increase prices as 
well as to foreclose the standard-setting organization’s consideration of 
alternate technologies.244 
 Writing patent continuation claims on the technology of others is 
currently lawful under patent law. The Federal Circuit has observed: 
[T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a 
patent application for the purpose of obtaining a right to ex-
clude a known competitor’s product from the market; nor is it 
                                                                                                                      
238 See Chiang, supra note 207, at 543. 
239 See 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009); see also In 
re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 624 (1996) (stating that computer manufacturer 
participated in standard-setting organization and certifying that it did not have IP rights 
on developing standards when in fact it did). 
240 Rambus, 522 F.3d at 459. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 460. 
244 See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. 
Corp. L. 1151, 1192 (2009); see also Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 
1024, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying equitable estoppel so as to enjoin some enforcement 
of patent where patentee misrepresented to standard-setting organization that it was in 
process of maintaining continuation applications on covered technology), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 2182 (2009). 
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in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended 
to cover a competitor’s product the applicant’s attorney has 
learned about during the prosecution of a patent application. 
Any such amendment or insertion must comply with all stat-
utes and regulations, of course, but, if it does, its genesis in 
the marketplace is simply irrelevant and cannot of itself evi-
dence deceitful intent.245 
Of course, the harm here does not occur from deceitful intent, but 
from inadequate notice of another’s property rights. Until the patent 
system provides adequate, timely notice of the scope of patent rights, 
the costs of the system are likely to outweigh its benefits. 
 Given that patents are public records providing notice of property 
rights, an important patent reform would place greater responsibility 
on the patent applicant to communicate effective and timely notice of 
what he has invented.246 Two competing principles are at play here. 
One is the patentee’s wish to claim everything he invented, even if it 
was unforeseen at the time the patent application was filed.247 The 
other is the potential infringer’s wish to have timely notice of every-
thing that constitutes infringement.248 The current system decidedly 
favors the former principle, even if it means that developers find out 
only after the fact that their technology infringes someone else’s pat-
ent.249 To use the perhaps overdrawn deed analogy, the current patent 
system can be equated to a system in which deeds leave some property 
lines ambiguous, permitting an owner to wait until a neighbor has built 
                                                                                                                      
245 Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); accord Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. ITC, 871 F.2d 1054, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also 
Bhaven N. Sampat & Mark A. Lemley, Examining Patent Examination 20–21 (Stanford Pub. 
Law Working Paper No. 1485011, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1485011 (stating that a significant number of patentees use continuations 
to delay the process in order to “modify their application to track developments in the 
marketplace”). 
246 See Boyden v. Burke, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 575, 582 (1852) (“Patents are public re-
cords. All persons are bound to take notice of their contents, and consequently should 
have a right to obtain copies of them.”). 
247 Defending this principle are Stephen T. Schreiner & Patrick A. Doody, Patent Con-
tinuation Applications: How the PTO’s Proposed New Rules Undermine an Important Part of the 
U.S. Patent System with Hundreds of Years of History, 88 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 556, 
565 (2006) (arguing for patentee’s right to capture uses or rewards to inventions that were 
not foreseen at the time of the application). 
248 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 148, at 46–47. 
249 See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 Harv. J.L. & 
Tech. 179, 181 (2007). 
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a house or swimming pool before asserting that the structure crossed 
the boundary and filing a trespass action. 
 The Constitution’s IP Clause clearly mandates that the purpose of 
the patent system is to incentivize invention,250 and the only things that 
create incentives are those that are anticipated at the time invention 
takes place. As a result, permitting a patentee to produce a claim years 
after an application is filed and then assert it retroactively creates disin-
centives for the innocent infringer by increasing the risks of develop-
ment, while doing little to incentivize the patentee.251 
 As a general rule patent continuations, or late claims, are used for 
one of three purposes. First, the claim may not have been foreseen by 
the applicant at the time the patent application was filed.252 Second, 
the claim may have been foreseen by the applicant, but the applicant 
chose to “lie in wait” until others developed new technology so that she 
could write a late claim on that technology.253 Third, the failure to get a 
claim right the first time may have been a mistake; for example, the 
claims may have been drafted more narrowly than intended, or they 
may have initially been drafted too broadly, rejected by the PTO, and 
then narrowed in a later submission.254 
 Our first-cut answers to these three problems are as follows. First, 
claims that were not included in the original application because the 
applicant did not foresee them were not part of the incentive to create 
the invention in the first place. As a result, giving them recognition cre-
ates entitlements that were not necessary to innovation and are thus 
inconsistent with the constitutional mandate that the goal of the patent 
system is to incentivize invention.255 At the very least, if such claims are 
                                                                                                                      
250 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
251 See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim 
Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 Geo. L.J. 1947, 1993 (2005) (noting 
that late claiming in response to a competitor’s invention necessarily involves claims that 
the inventor did not foresee at the time of filing the original application). 
252 See Chiang, supra note 207, at 526. 
253 Under 35 U.S.C. § 122, pending patent applications are held in secret for eighteen 
months subsequent to their filing date; a continuation is treated in the same way as an 
original application, so there is typically no notice on the record of any claim that is filed 
within the eighteen months prior to a patent search. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006). This is a 
plausible explanation of the decision in Rambus. See 522 F.3d at 469 (denying antitrust 
liability). 
254 Cf. Chiang, supra note 207, at 526. 
255 Cf. Kintner v. Atl. Commc’n Co., 240 F. 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1917). The court in Kintner 
stated: 
[T]he patentee is conclusively presumed to have known what he invented or 
discovered, better than did any one else, at the time he applied for a patent. 
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to be acknowledged, they should not be applied retroactively against 
those who made a technological choice before the claim was on record; 
this could be done either by making late claims effective only as of the 
date that they are approved and placed on record, or else by giving 
prior user rights to third parties who made infringing investments prior 
to the publication of the claim that they infringed.256 The general goal 
of the system, as of any property rights system, is notice first, and in-
fringement only later. Changing the system in this way would entirely 
change the patent applicant’s incentive structure; it would force her to 
write clear and reasonable claims and get them on the public record as 
soon as possible. 
 Second, strategically withheld claims operate as an affirmative dis-
incentive to invent and are clearly contrary to constitutionally man-
dated patent policy; they should never be applied retroactively to tech-
nological investments made prior to the approval of the claim.257 
 Third, the existence of innocent mistakes must be acknowledged, 
but the question of who should bear the loss remains. As a general rule, 
the common law did not penalize trespassers or other occupants by fix-
ing mistaken property descriptions retroactively unless there was actual 
notice, and with good reason.258 A rule placing the burden of mistakes 
on the person who makes them creates an incentive not to make them 
in the first place.259 Further, it is much less costly for someone to draft 
                                                                                                                      
This is true, even though subsequent students may perceive . . . that he dis-
closed methods, means, or processes having capabilities surpassing the inven-
tor’s dreams at the time [the] attempt was made to put achievements into 
words. 
Id.; cf. Meurer & Nard, supra note 251, at 1998 (“[A]n inventor’s incentive is not harmed 
much when, ex post, she is denied patent scope over technology that she did not foresee 
ex ante.”); see also Bohannan, supra note 77, at 633–34 (making similar argument for copy-
right). 
256 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Compe-
tition and Patent Law and Policy 16 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/ 
10/innovationrpt.pdf; Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 92, 92 (2006). 
257 See Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 
Tex. L. Rev. 1627, 1653–54 (2007) (referring to strategic delay in filing claims and then 
writing them on the technology of third parties as “misappropriation by amendment”). 
258 Cf. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 148, at 30–31. 
259 Another reason that late claiming should not be used to fix mistakes is that the doc-
trine of equivalents can help the patentee out by adding breadth to claims that were ini-
tially written too narrowly. See Douglas Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A 
Response to Meurer and Nard, 93 Geo. L.J. 2013, 2013–14 (2005) (noting extent to which 
doctrines of equivalents and patent continuations act as substitutes for one another—the 
former tends to read a broader range of coverage into existing claims by judicial decision 
while the latter tend to permit patentees to write broader claims for themselves after the 
fact); Meurer & Nard, supra note 251, at 1950; Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Doctrine of Equivalents 
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claims clearly early on—particularly if they are properly limited to that 
which is anticipated—than to put third-party investors at risk of in-
fringement for something that they could not reasonably discover.260 
B. The Judicial Road to Patent Reform 
 Despite these severe problems, patent law is clearly seeing the be-
ginning of reform. Although the late claiming problem still awaits a 
satisfactory solution, several judicial decisions have modified patent 
doctrine in other areas in an attempt to limit patentability to truly 
“nonobvious” inventions, provide clearer boundaries and notice of pat-
ented inventions, and limit the scope of injunctive relief.261 Although 
the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Bilski v. Kappos,262 discussed be-
low,263 missed an opportunity to effect necessary reforms to the scope 
of patentable subject matter, it did not derail judicial reforms that are 
already in place. 
1. Nonobviousness 
The United States Patent Act requires a sufficient difference between a 
claimed invention and the existing prior art that a person with ordinary 
skill in that art would not regard the claimed innovation as obvious.264 
This doctrine of “nonobviousness,” or “inventive step,” was developed 
judicially by the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century,265 and be-
                                                                                                                      
and Claiming the Future After Festo, 14 Fed. Cir. B.J. 403, 404 (2005); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The 
Historic and Modern Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part I (1790–1870), 87 J. 
Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 371, 373 (2005); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern 
Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the Future: Part II (1870–1952), 87 J. Pat. & Trademark 
Off. Soc’y 441, 443 (2005). 
260 F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Pat-
ent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 55, 99 (2003) (explaining that the patentee is in the 
least-cost position to avoid ambiguities in the notice and search process). 
261 See infra notes 264--432 and accompanying text. 
262 130 S. Ct. at 3228. 
263 See infra notes 353-400 and accompanying text. 
264 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). The statute states: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject mat-
ter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as 
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Id. The requirement was not always an explicit part of U.S. patent policy, although some 
version of it was certainly implied. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of 
Legal Innovation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 17 (2007). 
265 See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850). 
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came an explicit part of the Patent Act in 1952.266 Already in 1882, the 
Supreme Court had written the following: 
It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for 
every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, 
which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled 
mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufac-
tures. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges 
tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates 
a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to 
watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its 
foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them 
to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without 
contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. It 
embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and ap-
prehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to law-
suits and vexatious accountings for profits made in good 
faith.267 
 The statutory nonobviousness requirement does a number of 
things. First, it refers to “prior art” but does not specify its content.268 
The case law indicates that “prior art” includes, but is not limited to, 
previously issued patents and many patent applications, as well as other 
available knowledge that pertains to the subject matter of the patent.269 
Second, the statute refers to an imaginary person with “ordinary skill” 
in this prior art, which means someone who is a trained professional in 
the subject area of the patent, but presumably not a genius.270 Third, 
the statute relates this knowledge to the process by which a patent may 
be “obtained,” thus indicating that it is the responsibility of the patent 
examiner as well as the applicant to examine the prior art to determine 
whether the claimed innovation takes a sufficient “inventive step.”271 
The latter term is also used in the patent statutes of some foreign juris-
                                                                                                                      
266 On the doctrinal development, see generally Duffy, supra note 264. 
267 Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882). 
268 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
269 See, e.g., Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (describing scholarly articles as prior art); Kinetic Concepts, 554 F.3d at 1016 (explain-
ing that articles, books, and expert testimony on historical uses can constitute prior art). 
270 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
271 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“[T]he primary responsibility for 
sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office.”). 
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dictions.272 The basic idea is intuitively clear: we want to know whether 
an average person working in this particular discipline could readily 
have anticipated the subject matter of the claimed patent. If so, it is not 
patentable.273 
 The nonobviousness provision raises issues that go directly to the 
question of whether we grant too many patents. Should we patent only 
works of great creative genius, such as steamboats, telegraphs, light 
bulbs, or Prozac? Or is it enough if the patentee simply comes up with a 
clever little gadget or process that does something a little differently 
than it had been done before? Closely related is the question of “hind-
sight bias,” which has troubled the courts.274 Ex post, we might look at 
some new thing, such as a garbage bag with a pumpkin’s face printed 
on it, and say “that’s obvious,” or “I could have thought of that.”275 But 
the fact is that both trash bags and artistically drawn Jack-O-Lantern 
faces had been around for decades prior to a Federal Circuit decision 
holding that the combination constituted a nonobvious invention, and 
apparently no one had thought about putting them together on a 
commercial product.276 
 More generally, what is the appropriate domain of “prior art”? 
Does it refer only to previously issued patents and patent processes and 
technical journals? Or does it also include things that fall into the cate-
gory of common sense or perhaps even historical practice? This ques-
tion is of enormous practical importance because patent examiners are 
overworked officials who can realistically dedicate only so many hours 
to a given patent application and can readily look in only a limited 
number of places.277 The PTO maintains an enormous database of 
prior art, focusing mainly on patents and patent applications as well as 
                                                                                                                      
272 See European Patent Convention art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as amended 
Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html. 
273 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). 
274 See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hind-
sight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1391, 1429 (2006). 
275 See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated by In re Gart-
side, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (determining patent on garbage bags bearing pump-
kin face to be sufficiently nonobvious). 
276 See id. (determining, prior to the KSR decision, the patent on garbage bags bearing 
pumpkin face to be sufficiently nonobvious). For a critique, see Mandel, supra note 274, at 
1430. 
277 See Andrew Chin, Artful Prior Art and the Quality of DNA Patents, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 975, 
977 (2006) (describing the tendency of overworked examiners to concentrate on previ-
ously issued patents and patent applications). 
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some technical materials.278 Private databases are available as well.279 
The examiner will consult the database, but patent applicants are also 
required to disclose known prior art.280 A failure to disclose could result 
in patent unenforceability.281 
 The usefulness of searches for prior art is greatly driven by the na-
ture of the market. Often when new technologies emerge, participants 
“transport” ideas from old settings into the new ones. Amazon.com’s 
famous patent on “one-click shopping” is a good example.282 The main 
ingredients in one-click shopping are a customer willing to store log-in 
information with a merchant, a valid credit card number, and a ship-
ping address.283 Then, presumably with a single mouse click, the cus-
tomer can select an item, and Amazon.com automatically charges the 
item to the stored credit card and ships it to the stored shipping ad-
dress. For purposes of argument, we may assume that Amazon.com was 
the first to come up with this innovation in Internet shopping. But what 
about more traditional markets? Since time immemorial, stores have 
been permitting regular customers to open accounts. The stores main-
tained names, delivery addresses, and perhaps some credit information 
on index cards. When your pre-World War II grandfather called the 
store and asked for a sack of flour to be delivered, the shopkeeper 
would load it into the pickup, charge the account, and deliver the flour 
to the address on the account slip. At the end of the month, your 
grandfather would get the bill. Should Amazon.com be entitled to col-
lect a royalty from the thousands of Internet vendors who simply 
adapted to the Internet an age-old way of making shopping easier? The 
courts properly doubted it.284 The reason that patents for business 
methods such as one-click shopping are granted in the first place is that 
                                                                                                                      
278 See Patent Full-Text and Full-Page Image Databases, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
http://patft.uspto.gov (last visited Aug. 31, 2010). 
279 See Searching Overview, IP.com, http://priorartdatabase.com/prior-art-searching.html 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2010). 
280 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
281 See, e.g., Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1062 (explaining the failure to include reference 
to a previously published book that was known to the drafter of the patent application). 
282 See, e.g., Method and Sys. for Placing a Purchase Order Via a Commc’ns Network, 
U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (issued Sept 28, 1999). 
283 See id. 
284 See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1363, 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (denying preliminary injunction after finding likely obviousness, given the prior 
art). The patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411, with its claims somewhat narrowed, was con-
firmed upon re-examination in March, 2010. See Amazon One-Click Patent Slides Through 
Reexamination, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/ 
amazon-one-click-patent-slides-through-reexamination.html. 
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relevant prior art is construed too narrowly.285 Justice Stevens noted the 
problem in his Bilski concurrence and argued that for this reason, as 
well as many others, the scope of patentable subject matter should ex-
clude business method patents.286 
 If something is “obvious,” many people are likely to discover it on 
their own. As a result, patents that fail to meet a serious requirement of 
nonobviousness are likely to be infringed by innocent copiers more of-
ten than patents that require serious creativity. This is a vexing, recur-
ring problem with business method patents. If we grant patents on very 
slight departures from historical practices, such as one-click shopping, 
many other business persons are likely to discover the process on their 
own. Because independent discovery is not a defense to a patent in-
fringement claim, however, this would place businesses “in constant 
fear of litigation” unless they undertook the costs of conducting a pat-
ent search for every minor innovation in business.287 For example, a 
photographer who developed the perfectly ordinary idea of posting 
her photos on the web for inspection and sale might discover that she 
would be infringing a patent claiming control over that process.288 
 In its 2007 decision KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the U.S. 
Supreme Court tightened the standard for demonstrating nonobvious-
ness of patent claims.289 There, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
rigid application of the teaching-suggestion-motivation (“TSM”) test, 
although not necessarily the test itself.290 Under the Federal Circuit’s 
version of the test, a patent claim was obvious only if there was a specific 
“teaching” or “suggestion” in the prior art regarding the combination 
of previously known elements into the new element that constitutes the 
subject of the patent claim at issue.291 Thus, the Federal Circuit’s appli-
                                                                                                                      
285 See Susan Walmsley Graf, Comment, Improving Patent Quality Through Identification of 
Relevant Prior Art: Approaches to Increase Information Flow to the Patent Office, 11 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 495, 502–03 (2007) (noting the problem, particularly with reference to 
software patents, where examiners tend to focus prior art searches on earlier patents even 
though the history of software patents is short); see also Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six 
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 
14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577, 589 (1999) (noting problem in new technologies when prior 
art searches focus too much on previously issued patents and patent applications). 
286 130 S. Ct. at 3256 n.55 (Stevens, J., concurring); see supra notes 353--400 and ac-
companying text. 
287 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3256 n.55 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
288 See Process for Providing Event Photographs for Inspection, Selection & Distribu-
tion via a Computer Network ,U.S. Patent No. 7,047,214 B2 (filed May 16, 2006). 
289 550 U.S. at 427–28. 
290 See id. 
291 See id. at 421. 
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cation of the TSM test rendered a claim obvious only if someone had 
already anticipated it, or at least the need for it.292 By contrast, the Su-
preme Court unanimously held that a patent claim is obvious if “a per-
son having ordinary skill in the art” (“PHOSITA”) could have antici-
pated the innovation offered by the patent.293 
 The Supreme Court’s KSR rule seems eminently sensible. When a 
PHOSITA can foresee the benefit in doing what the patent claims, the 
claimed improvement seems obvious to try. The principal value of the 
TSM test is for rejecting claims, because the fact that the TSM is already 
in the prior art indicates obviousness. But the TSM test cannot be dis-
positive for accepting claims because some things that are not taught or 
suggested in the prior art might still be foreseeable to the PHOSITA. A 
forward-looking test is particularly important in young and fast-
developing markets, such as high technology and the Internet.294 In 
those markets, the amount of conventional prior art is much less volu-
minous than in older well-established markets, and the pace of innova-
tion is fast enough that many developments will be anticipated before 
they are documented in the prior art.295 
2. Tactile Subject Matter and Overly Abstract Patent Claims 
 Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act defines the scope of patentable 
subject matter as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter” or “new and useful improvement,” that also 
meets other patentability requirements in the statute.296 It is often said 
that section 101 permits patentability of “anything under the sun,” a 
phrase that the Supreme Court in 1980 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
quoted from earlier congressional reports. The Court stated that “Con-
gress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the 
sun that is made by man.”297 In fact, however, as Justice Stevens pointed 
out in his Bilski concurrence, the full statement in the House Report 
that Chakrabarty quoted says something quite different: 
                                                                                                                      
292 See id. at 427–28. 
293 See id. 
294 See Merges, supra note 285, at 589. 
295 See id.; see also Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 St. 
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296 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
297 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). Justice Stevens was part of the majority that made the as-
sertion. See Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring 
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A person may have “invented” a machine or a manufacture, 
which may include anything under the sun that is made by 
man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 
unless the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled.298 
Contrary to its representation in Chakrabarty, the sentence in fact con-
trasts the scope of things that might be “invented,” placing that word in 
quotation marks, with the scope of things that are patentable. Further, 
Justice Stevens noted, the reference is only to a “machine or manufac-
ture,” not to the full range of conceivable inventions. If an invention is 
not a machine or manufacture, the “everything under the sun” predi-
cate simply does not apply. 
 A useful and administrable doctrine of patent subject matter is es-
sential to making the patent system manageable. In his Bilski opinion 
for the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy played down the independent 
importance of the patentable subject matter requirement, observing 
that in any event a patent application must meet the requirements that 
the invention be novel, nonobvious, and fully and particularly de-
scribed.299 But this overlooks one critical element of the requirement of 
patentable subject matter, which is that it can nearly always be deter-
mined by an examination of the four corners of a patent application. 
By contrast, determining whether the requirements of novelty and 
nonobvious subject matter have been met requires a search and inter-
pretation of a very large and often uncertain record of prior art.300 
 A well-designed rule of patentable subject matter should do two 
things at the same time. First, it should enable examiners and subse-
quent courts or other tribunals to determine patentability on the basis 
of the application itself so that a costly evaluation of prior art is not al-
ways required. Second, to the extent possible, it should tie patent law 
                                                                                                                      
298 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3249 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5 
(1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)). 
299 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101--103, 112(2006)). 
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more closely to its Constitutional purpose, which is to incentivize inven-
tions whose benefits to the public exceed their social costs. 
 The enormous case law and literature on patentable subject mat-
ter covers the patentability of things such as living organisms, genetic 
mutations, abstract ideas, the laws of nature, or business methods.301 
One problem particularly important to competition policy and innova-
tion is excessive abstraction, which allows patent claims to spill over into 
unanticipated areas, permitting patentees to monopolize things that 
they really did not invent and perhaps did not even foresee.302 When 
the claims in issued patents are too abstract, later innovators cannot 
determine whether their work is covered by another’s patent. Nothing 
suppresses irreversible investment in innovation more than a substan-
tial fear that once the innovation is developed, a court will find that it 
in fact belongs to someone else. The vaguely defined category of “busi-
ness method” patents is particularly vulnerable to excessive abstrac-
tion.303 As a result, these patents have produced so much litigation that 
the net welfare effects are very likely negative.304 This places such pat-
ents on a collision course with the Constitution’s IP Clause, which does 
not authorize patents that retard rather than promote innovation.305 
 An example is the infamous eData patent, which at its core cov-
ered the sale of electronic files such as music downloaded at the point 
of sale in shopping mall kiosks.306 The patent claims, however, included 
coverage of all sales of information that was loaded into a physical ob-
ject at the point of sale if the data were transported from a remote 
                                                                                                                      
301 See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (discussing patentability of synthesized bacteria 
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952 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:905 
source.307 The patentee later filed successful infringement suits against 
many sellers who engaged in services such as selling software, music, 
eBooks, and other digital technologies over the Internet.308 Bear in 
mind that the eData inventor did not invent any part of the technology 
for transmitting a computer file over a communication line and then 
recording it onto a tape or other storage device.309 That technology was 
already in place and included such things as hard drives, software and 
file formats, telecommunications and modems, and cassette recorders, 
to name a few.310 Rather, the patent claimed the idea of telecommuni-
cating electronic files and charging money for them at the receiving 
end.311 The patent’s description and drawings are simple, empty boxes 
bearing titles such as “information file unit” and “reproduction unit.”312 
These referred generically to the full range of devices including hard 
drives or CD burners that a file-transfer system might contain.313 Under 
this patent, if a store (1) electronically downloaded digital songs from a 
remote supply source such as iTunes, (2) copied them onto CDs, and 
(3) sold them to customers on site, it would be committing infringe-
ment, even though all three of these activities were accomplished with 
technologies that either existed prior to the time of the patent applica-
tion or were later invented by someone else.314 
 One can approach the abstraction problem that eData raises in dif-
ferent ways. One solution is to resort to a system of “central claiming” as 
was once common in the judicial interpretation of patent claims.315 
Under that system, the courts tried to assess patent scope by taking a 
less technical, more common sense look at the core of an invention, 
focusing more on the written description rather than considering the 
outermost reaches of its claims.316 Another solution, indicated by the 
                                                                                                                      
307 See id. 
308 See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331–33 (Fed. 
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Federal Circuit’s In re Bilski decision in 2008, is to tie patent eligibility 
under section 101 of the Patent Act more securely to tactile subject 
matter.317 In re Bilski’s “machine/transformation” test queried whether 
a particular method or process for which a patent is sought (1) is tied 
to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms an article into a 
different state or thing.318 
 The Federal Circuit’s Bilski approach to eligible subject matter was 
hardly new. Prior to the Civil War, the Supreme Court observed how 
overreaching can occur when claims become too abstract.319 In 1853, 
the Court considered the validity of a reissued patent for the Morse 
telegraph.320 Samuel F. B. Morse’s patent contained eight claims.321 Five 
of them covered the functional aspects of the mechanical transmitter 
and receiver that Morse claimed were unique, and that distinguished 
his invention from those of numerous rivals.322 Another claim was on 
the set of dots and dashes that came to be known as Morse code, and 
another was on the use of the Morse code in combination with the 
hardware described in the earlier claims.323 In addition, however, Morse 
included this eighth claim: 
“I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or 
parts of machinery, described in the foregoing specifications 
and claims; the essence of my invention being the use of the 
motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call 
electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or print-
ing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, 
                                                                                                                      
317 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (permitting a patent to one who “invents or discovers any 
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being a new application of that power, of which I claim to be 
the first inventor or discoverer.”324 
 The Supreme Court approved Morse’s claims on the device de-
scribed in the patent specification and the code.325 Chief Justice Taney’s 
opinion for the Court, however, rejected the eighth claim.326 Taney ob-
served that during the period leading up to Morse’s patent application, 
many scientists had been studying a variety of ways to use electricity plus 
magnets to send long-distance communications.327 Morse devised a par-
ticular system that permitted the signals to be sent long distances, 
rather than quickly fading in a few hundred feet, although some Euro-
pean scientists had similar successes at about the same time.328 Morse’s 
eighth claim covered not only what he had actually invented, but the 
entire principle of using electromagnetic impulses to communicate 
over long distances.329 Just like the patent approved by the Federal Cir-
cuit in the eData case a century and a half later, Morse was trying to 
commandeer all future technologies for accomplishing something.330 
Chief Justice Taney complained that: 
For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the 
onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or 
printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic 
current, without using any part of the process or combina-
tion set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His invention 
may be less complicated—less liable to get out of order—less 
expensive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is 
covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the 
public have the benefit of it without the permission of this 
patentee.331 
 Taney’s observations were prescient because Morse’s telegraph 
system was in fact quite primitive.332 Tremendous progress in telegraph 
technology was on the horizon, including faster keys, receivers that 
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produced sounds rather than dots and dashes on strips of paper, and 
eventually the development of teletype devices that printed letters of 
the alphabet at the receiving end.333 If accepted, Morse’s eighth claim 
would likely have delayed many of these inventions.334 Taney’s observa-
tion also indicates that excessive abstraction is a competition problem. 
Overly broad claims eliminate rivalry because the patent covers not 
only the technology that the patentee actually invented, but other po-
tentially competing technologies that might have entered the market 
had the patent not squelched them. 
 Early on, courts invalidated patents for their lack of tactile en-
gagement. As the Supreme Court observed in 1868, “‘[I]f the subject-
matter be neither a machine nor a manufacture, nor a composition of 
matter, then . . . it must be an art, for there can be no valid patent ex-
cept it be for a thing made, or for the art or process of making a thing.’”335 
Early twentieth-century courts began upholding what might be charac-
terized as business method patents, provided that the subject matter of 
the patent was a tangible good or a process for changing a good in 
some useful way.336 In 1911, a federal appeals court sustained a patent 
on a scrip book containing coupons that could be exchanged for rail-
way tickets on a dollar rather than mile basis, thus permitting them to 
be interchanged among different railroads that had differing fare 
structures.337 The court concluded as follows: 
Nor do we think that this patented concept is nothing more 
than a business method. Its use is a part of a business method. 
The ticket patented is not a method at all, but a physical tan-
gible facility, without which the method would have been im-
practicable, and with which it is practicable.338 
 Another federal appeals court approved a patent on a perforated 
railroad ticket that could be torn in specific places to show which part 
of a route a passenger had already traveled and which parts of the 
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ticket were still useable.339 The court emphasized that the patent “de-
scribe[d] a distinctive physical structure.”340 By contrast, if the method 
consisted only of a new use of an established device, the courts were 
hostile. A 1903 decision refused to permit a patent on the use of an or-
dinary business ledger to create entries that would track railroad cargo 
to ensure that it was not sent to the wrong destination.341 Other courts 
denied patentability to bookkeeping systems that simply employed pre-
existing ledger books to monitor restaurant waiters’ receipts or to track 
bad debts.342 The physical objects affected by these patents were all well-
established prior art. At most, the patentee was contributing a different 
way of using them. 
 In sum, the courts have emphasized since the nineteenth century 
that patents must relate in some formative way to a physical object that 
is described in the written description of a patent application. As the 
Morse telegraph decision recognized, when the subject matter of pat-
ents becomes more abstract, patent claims have a tendency to reach out 
into unanticipated places.343 Morse had been fairly honest about this— 
his patent claim reached to all technologies “however developed,” indi-
cating that he was asserting control over devices that he himself could 
not foresee.344 The chill on innovation could hardly be more severe— 
those knowing of the patent would know that any device they made for 
improving electromagnetic long distance communications would fall 
under Morse’s claim and constitute infringement, no matter how novel 
and important it was in fact.345 
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Patent Scope, 16 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 7, 8 (2008) (acknowledging problems caused by ex-
cessive abstraction, but also observing that writing concrete claims is extremely tedious 
work). 
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 Patents that do not create or transform specific physical objects 
rarely have clear boundaries.346 Recognizing this, the courts have im-
posed a number of limitations. For example, the Supreme Court has 
said that one cannot patent an abstract idea, and the Court has com-
pared purely mental patents to laws of nature, which cannot be pat-
ented.347 The rise of the computer and later the Internet has led to an 
explosion of process patents in data processing, financial services and 
banking, transaction facilitation, risk determination, tax planning, edu-
cational materials provided on the Internet, and even dating strate-
gies.348 What many of these patents have in common is that their princi-
pal useful content consists of formulas or algorithms that can potentially 
have a wide variety of uses.349 Patenting a formula itself, in contrast to a 
specific and concrete application of a formula, can come dangerously 
close to patenting either a law of nature or an abstract idea, which pat-
ent policy forbids. The Supreme Court made that distinction seventy 
years ago in acknowledging a patent for a radio antenna whose length 
and attitude were based on a well-known mathematical formula (the 
“Abraham’s formula”) relating wave length to optimal antenna length 
and position.350 The Court concluded that “[w]hile a scientific truth, or 
the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel 
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may 
be.”351 The Court then limited the scope of the patent to specific struc-
tures that applied the mathematical formula.352 
 The Bilski patent application comprised a set of mental steps lead-
ing to a formula for computing the optimal balance of investment for 
minimizing risk.353 It involved a series of hypothetical transactions be-
tween buyers and sellers of a particular commodity who had different 
                                                                                                                      
346 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 148, at 187–88 (focusing mainly on software pat-
ents). 
347 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (excluding from patentable subject 
matter “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work.”). 
348 See, e.g., Internet-Based Educ. Support Sys. & Methods, U.S. Patent No. 6,988,138 
(filed June 30, 2000); Method of Designating Dating Status, U.S. Patent No. 7,255,277 
(filed Apr. 6, 2006). 
349 See ’138 Patent; ’277 Patent. 
350 See Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 
351 Id. (emphasis added). 
352 Id. at 98–99. 
353 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949. 
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risk profiles.354 Some tended to profit when the value of the commodity 
increased while others profited when it decreased.355 For instance, sup-
pose that a coal-burning electric utility must purchase large quantities 
of coal and sell its power at regulated rates. The utility suffers if the 
price of coal goes up, but coal mining companies benefit. As a result, 
an optimal investment strategy for a utility might be to purchase some 
stock in coal mining companies, which means that operating losses 
from high coal prices would be offset by gains in the stock’s value. 
 In essence, Bilski was attempting to patent a very general form of 
risk “hedging.”356 Hedging is nothing more than a way of managing 
risks, and the financial literature has been filled with such strategies for 
decades.357 The literature on hedging is highly mathematical, and dif-
ferent hedging strategies produce different formulas that can be ap-
plied in a variety of settings, including commodity pricing, energy man-
agement, foreign currency exchange rates, construction risks, and in-
surance, to name a few.358 Even the process described in the Bilski patent 
application of initiating hypothetical transactions in markets with differ-
ing risk profiles is well established in the literature.359 
 In rejecting the claim, the examiner concluded that “the invention 
is not implemented on a specific apparatus and merely manipulates 
[an] abstract idea and solves a purely mathematical problem without 
any limitation to a practical application.”360 The important factors about 
the Bilski patent were that: (1) it was not a patent on a specific apparatus 
or machine; and (2) it was not for a process that would make (or im-
prove) a specific apparatus or machine.361 
 With regard to the problem of abstract claims, it is important to 
note that the specification in the Bilski patent application described a 
risk-management process for energy markets where prices fluctuated 
                                                                                                                      
354 See id. 
355 See id. 
356 See id. 
357 See, e.g., Carol Alexander, Market Risk Analysis: Quantitative Methods in 
Finance 181–82 (2008); Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History 
of the World 324 (2008). 
358 See Patrick Cusatis & Martin Thomas, Hedging Instruments and Risk Man-
agement 1–2 (2005); Robert W. Kolb, Understanding Futures Markets 170–71, 176–
81 (3d ed. 1991). 
359 See R. H. Snape & B. S. Yamey, Test of the Effectiveness of Hedging, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 540, 
540 (1965) (proposing the use of series of hypothetical transactions to test outcomes from 
hedging strategies). 
360 See Ex parte Bilski, No. 02-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006) 
(quoting patent examiner) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
361 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949. 
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mainly due to weather.362 The first claim, however, referred generally to 
“commodities,” indicating that the patent later could have been as-
serted in any market subject to risk differentials.363 As a result, the Bilski 
patent, like the eData patent, would have been a little like a deed to 
Camelot—its location and boundaries impossible to identify. These pat-
ents spill over from things that are arguably novel to processes that have 
been well known for centuries. An insurance company trying to diver-
sify its risks or a farmer selling grain futures to hedge against a low 
market price for her crop might discover that she owes Bilski a royalty, 
even though both insurers and farmers have been doing these things 
for decades. 
 The Federal Circuit responded with its double-branched ma-
chine/transformation test: 
[A]n applicant may show that a process claim satisfies § 101 ei-
ther by showing that his claim is tied to a particular machine, 
or by showing that his claim transforms an article. Certain con-
siderations are applicable to analysis under either branch. 
First, . . . the use of a specific machine or transformation of an 
article must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to 
impart patent-eligibility. . . . Second, the involvement of the 
machine or transformation in the claimed process must not 
merely be insignificant extra-solution activity.364 
 The Bilski problem would be much less substantial if the patent 
laws contained a right of independent discovery, as the copyright and 
trade secret laws do.365 One cannot be liable for copyright or trade se-
cret infringement unless she actually had access to the owner’s writing, 
product, or process and copied from it in some way.366 Any property 
system that makes infringers strictly liable for trespasses must include a 
mechanism for giving investors adequate and timely notice of their 
property interests. As the Supreme Court observed as early as the 
1960s, until a “process claim has been reduced to production of a 
product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly 
                                                                                                                      
362 See id. at 949–50. 
363 See id. at 949. 
364 Id. at 961–62 (citations omitted). 
365 See Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 
Mich. L. Rev. 475, 479 (2006); see also Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying 
in Patent Law 6–7 (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 1270160, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270160 (suggesting that most alleged patent infringers are not 
copyists). 
366 See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 365, at 2. 
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are not capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, 
and perhaps unknowable area.”367 
 This problem is exacerbated by the lingering effects of the doctrine 
of equivalents, which gives patentees infringement claims for uses that 
do not literally infringe the claims of the patent.368 Patent infringement 
claims under the doctrine of equivalents are permitted even when the 
innovator developed its innovation independently.369 The doctrine 
makes intuitive sense when applied to someone who intentionally in-
vents around a known patent by making tiny changes that fall just out-
side the scope of a patent claim.370 In other cases, however, finding in-
fringement against an innocent innovator under the doctrine of equiva-
lents simply rewards a patentee for writing fuzzy claims and relying on a 
default rule that requires the innovator to invest at its peril.371 
 The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that 
the Bilski patent was invalid, but rejected its holding that the ma-
chine/transformation criterion is the sole test for patentability.372 
Rather, the Court returned to the formulation stated in earlier deci-
sions such as Gottschalk v. Benson373 to the effect that the machine/ 
transformation test was the “clue” to patentability.374 As the Supreme 
Court pointed out, the machine/transformation test seems narrower 
and more rigid than the statutory language, which defines “process” 
broadly and without any qualification resembling the machine/trans-
formation test.375 For that reason, although the Supreme Court had 
often relied on machine/transformation language as a key to assessing 
patentability, it had never found the test to be exclusive.376 
                                                                                                                      
367 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
368 See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 365, at 5–6. 
369 See id. 
370 See Meurer & Nard, supra note 251, at 1949. 
371 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equiva-
lents, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 955, 960 (2007). 
372 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
373 See 409 U.S. at 70. 
374 See id. (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is 
the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular ma-
chines.”). 
375 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful proc-
ess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”); see also id. § 100(b) (“The term ‘process’ means process, art, or method, and in-
cludes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.”). 
376 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (stating that the test was “not intended to be an exhaustive 
or exclusive test”). 
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 At the same time, no part of the patent statute may be construed 
so as to make it inconsistent with either its constitutional authorization 
or its drafter’s intended purpose. If the subject of an application falls 
outside of that authorization, it is no answer to say that the PTO exam-
iner can subsequently fix things by applying a different technical doc-
trine, such as the requirement of nonobviousness.377 For example, 
nothing in section 101 of the Patent Act, which defines patentable sub-
ject matter, indicates that “abstract ideas” cannot be patented.378 The 
statute covers “any new and useful process,” making no exclusion for 
thought processes.379 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently 
stated that abstract ideas cannot be patented, and the Bilski majority 
based its conclusion of nonpatentability on those holdings.380 With re-
spect to laws of nature, also not mentioned in section 101, the Supreme 
Court has distinguished between the discovery of the laws themselves 
(unpatentable) and a particular application of those laws (pat-
                                                                                                                      
377 See 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
378 See id. 
379 See id.; Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dismissing grant of certiorari in Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. 
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) as improvidently granted). In 
his dissent, Justice Breyer explained as follows: 
The justification for the principle [that laws of nature are not patentable sub-
ject matter] does not lie in any claim that “laws of nature” are obvious, or that 
their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. To the contrary, research 
into such matters may be costly and time consuming; monetary incentives 
may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of 
great benefit to the human race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that 
sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional objective of patent 
and copyright protection. 
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The 
Constitution explicitly limited patentability to ‘the national purpose of advancing the use-
ful arts—the process today called technological innovation.’”); cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584, 596 (1978) (“[W]e must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent 
rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.”). 
380130 S. Ct. at 3231 (“The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a 
mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea . . . .”); see also Diehr, 450 
U.S. at 185 (“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas.”); id. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that “processes 
involving mental operations” are not patentable subject matter); Parker, 437 U.S. at 598 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“It is a commonplace that laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter.”); cf. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (using the 
term “abstract intellectual concepts”); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 
498, 507 (1874) (“An idea of itself is not patentable”); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 
156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a 
motive; these cannot be patented . . . .”). 
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entable).381 This is so notwithstanding the fact that section 101 includes 
within its protection one who “discovers any new and useful process . . . 
or composition of matter.”382 Congress drafted section 101 broadly in 
order to extend patentable subject matter to the full range of its power 
under the IP Clause of the Constitution,383 but that still gives the courts 
the job of determining what that power is.384 
 Justice Stevens’ opinion for four concurring Justices came much 
closer than the majority did to aligning the requirement of patentable 
subject matter with the innovation-incentivizing goals of patent law.385 
He agreed with the majority that the machine/transformation test 
should not be the exclusive criterion of patentability, but from that 
point departed in a different direction that he believed would “restore 
patent law to its historical and constitutional moorings.”386 He showed 
that historically the framers of the Patent Act never intended to include 
patents on business methods. After temporarily approving them, the 
Federal Circuit had come around in Bilski to a test that excluded “gen-
eral methods of doing business” as well as some other subjects that fell 
                                                                                                                      
381 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 
132 (1948). 
382 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). On the meaning of “discover” or “discovery” in 
the Constitution’s IP Clause and the Patent Act, and its relation to promotion of science 
and the useful arts, see Stephen McKenna, Patentable Discovery?, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 
1241, 1243 (1996). McKenna notes that one important distinction between discoveries and 
inventions is that the discoveries already existed before they were discovered, even if they 
were not generally known. See id. The author concludes that the distinction between “dis-
coveries” (unpatentable) and “inventions” (patentable) is entirely judicial. See id. In any 
event, both the framers of the Constitution and the drafters of section 101 probably re-
garded the terms “invention” and “discovery” as largely synonymous. 
383 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (“The subject-matter provisions of the patent law 
have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting 
‘the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts’ with all that means for the social and eco-
nomic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001). 
384 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 151 (Breyer, J., dissenting); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 
998 (Mayer, J., dissenting); see also Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1375 (“The Constitution explicitly 
limited patentability to ‘the national purpose of advancing the useful arts—the process 
today called technological innovation.’”). Antitrust does very much the same thing that 
the Patent Act does. For example, the Sherman Act reaches to the full extent of congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 
U.S. 533, 558 (1944). Nevertheless, the courts continue to decide whether jurisdiction 
under the Commerce Clause obtains in particular situations. Compare, e.g., Summit Health, 
Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 333 (1991) (finding jurisdiction), with United States v. Yellow 
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 233–34 (1947) (finding no jurisdiction). 
385 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor; Justice Breyer also wrote a separate concurrence, 
which Justice Scalia joined in part. See id. at 3257 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
386 Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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within the classification of process patents.387 He would have preferred 
a holding that Bilski’s “method is not a ‘process’ because it describes 
only a general method of engaging in business transactions, and busi-
ness methods are not patentable.”388 
 Justice Stevens’ analysis of section 101’s term “process” showed 
how it certainly could not refer to everything that a lay person would 
regard as a process. That would lead to the absurd conclusion that even 
something like a series of dance steps would be patentable if it were 
sufficiently novel.389 He traced the general hostility toward business 
method patents in both English and American patent law,390 showing 
that the term “useful arts” in the IP clause almost certainly did not en-
compass business methods.391 Justice Stevens noted, for example, that 
Noah Webster’s First American dictionary defined the term “art” as the 
“disposition or modification of things by human skill, to answer the 
purpose intended.” Webster’s definition distinguished “useful or me-
chanic” arts from “liberal or polite” arts.392 “[F]ields such as business 
and finance were not generally considered part of the ‘useful arts’ in 
the Founding Era.”393 When Congress amended the Patent Act in 1952, 
it substituted the more modern term “process” for the term “art,” but 
did not intend to change the scope of meaning from its original under-
standing.394 The often-misquoted “anything under the sun” statement 
in the 1952 Act’s legislative history was meant in fact to contrast the 
scope of all things that someone might conceivably “invent” with the 
scope of patentable inventions. Further, the phrase itself referred only 
to a “machine or manufacture,” which excluded art or process.395 
 Like most of the scholarship he cited, Justice Stevens could not 
find a positive link between patentability and the incentive to innovate 
                                                                                                                      
387 Id. 
388 Id. 
389 Id. at 3238. 
390 Id. at 3239--48. 
391 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3249 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
392 Id. at 3243 (citing 1 An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) 
(facsimile ed.); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139, 
1164 (1999) (“[The Framers] undoubtedly contemplated the industrial, mechanical and 
manual arts of the late eighteenth century, in contrast to the seven ‘liberal arts’ and the 
four ‘fine arts’ of classical learning.”)). Justice Stevens also noted that other dictionaries, 
such as Samuel Johnson’s, defined the term more broadly. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3243 n.27 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Samuel Johnson, 1 Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage (1773) (reprint 1978)). 
393 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3244 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
394 Id. at 3249 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184). 
395 Id. at 3248–49. 
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in business.396 Further, given the sequential nature of innovations in 
business methods, particularly in a competitive environment, patenting 
them often serves to restrain rather than facilitate further innova-
tion.397 Justice Stevens noted: 
If business methods could be patented, then many business 
decisions, no matter how small, could be potential patent vio-
lations. Businesses would either live in constant fear of litiga-
tion or would need to undertake the costs of searching 
through patents that describe methods of doing business, at-
tempting to decide whether their innovation is one that re-
mains in the public domain.398 
 These problems are exacerbated by the “potential vagueness” of 
business method patents,399 which often are “not confined to any one 
industry” and for which “there is not a well-confined body of prior art 
to consult . . . .”400 Justice Stevens’ historical argument against business 
method patents is devastating. Although he was not able to provide a 
new, comprehensive definition of patentable subject matter, he did tie 
the meaning of section 101’s patentable subject matter requirement to 
the rationales for patenting in the first place, namely, to further innova-
tion. This may require invalidation of certain classes of patents cate-
gorically, something that the Supreme Court has done in the past for 
abstract principles and laws of nature. 
C. eBay: The Relation Between Remedies and Notice 
 In 2006, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected a Federal Circuit rule that gave patentees virtually blan-
ket authority to obtain injunctions against infringement.401 Rather, the 
                                                                                                                      
396 Id. at 3254 (citing Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. 
L. Rev. 1575, 1618 (2003); Michael Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 761, 826 (2002); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Are Business Methods Patents Bad for Business? 
16 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 263, 274--77 (2000); Richard A. Posner, The 
Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, Daedalus, Spring 2002, at 5. 
397 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3255 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing James Bessen & Eric 
Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 Rand J. Econ. 611, 613 (2009)). 
398 Id. at 3256 (citing Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. 
Rev. 465, 487--88 (2004)). 
399 Id. (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)). 
400 Id. at 3256 n.55 (citing, inter alia, Rebecca Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Eco-
nomics Agenda for the Patent System, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2081, 2090 (2000). 
401 See 547 U.S. at 394. 
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patentee must show the traditional set of equity requirements for an 
injunction—namely, irreparable injury, inadequacy of damages as a 
remedy, and that the balance of hardships and the public interest favor 
an injunction.402 
 One might view eBay as creating compulsory licensing by another 
name—which might occur if courts simply permitted ongoing patent 
infringement with damages as the sole remedy. But eBay has its limita-
tions as an alternative to compulsory licensing. First, it does not apply 
to ex ante requests for dealing but only to remedies once an infringe-
ment is found.403 This means that someone who knows about another’s 
patent right in advance cannot insist on having it.404 Rather, the devel-
oper must go ahead and develop, risking that if infringement is found, 
a subsequent court will refuse to issue an injunction and award only 
damages. Further, knowing about a patent in advance may be a good 
reason for issuing the injunction—eBay has most of its bite in situations 
where developers did not know they were infringing and were caught 
by surprise.405 
 Even if we thought that dominant firms had a duty to share newly 
developed technologies, eBay would not be a reliable way of implement-
ing it.406 As a result, it is not a good substitute for an antitrust rule that 
compels dealing. eBay is better at dealing with various ex post problems 
that arise because patent boundaries are so poorly defined.407 Although 
it is hardly a complete fix, eBay can operate to reduce the risk of inno-
vating where patents held by others cannot be searched effectively and 
affordably.408 One good example is patents held by nonproducing enti-
                                                                                                                      
402 See id. at 391. The problem of eBay and patent trolls is discussed in Lee Anne 
Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1403, 1414–15 (2009). 
403 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394 
404 For explanations of how risk aversion under uncertainty effectively cedes to IP 
rights holders larger rights than they actually own, see Christina Bohannan, Taming the 
Derivative Works Right: A Modest Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 
12 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 669, 688–89 n.113 (2010) and James Gibson, Risk Aversion and 
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 884, 951 (2007). 
405 See 547 U.S. at 394. 
406 See generally Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 253 (2009) (argu-
ing that the whole problem of compulsory licensing needs to be examined, and that man-
datory licensing might serve as a policy offset for permitting other practices, such as bun-
dling of IP rights, that would be less anticompetitive if there were a compulsory licensing 
duty). 
407 See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 505, 554 (2010). 
408 See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 19, 22 (explaining that 
the cost of patent searches is so high, and results so unreliable, that firms often simply 
innovate now and worry about infringement litigation later). Nevertheless, the Federal 
Circuit has indicated that failure to search may result in a finding of willful infringement, 
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ties (“NPEs”), or patent “trolls,” who develop or acquire patents for 
complex technologies but do not practice them.409 Given the high costs 
and poor results of patent searches, a firm might discover only after the 
fact that it has made a costly, irreversible investment in technology cov-
ered by someone else’s patent.410 One consequence of eBay is that 
courts have tended to limit NPEs to damages.411 
 Dealing with patent trolls is not so much a problem of the right 
type of relief as the nature and timeliness of notice. Limiting the in-
fringer’s liability to damages in cases where notice is poor serves to give 
innovators at least some confidence that they can move into a new area 
without subsequently facing prohibitive, gargantuan penalties that the 
right to an injunction can produce. A rule that placed a larger pre-
mium on notice would also give patentees an incentive to see to it that 
their patents are effectively communicated to potential infringers. For 
example, in both the D.C. Circuit’s Rambus decision and in the 2008 
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Qual-
comm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., the patentee, who was participating in stan-
dard-setting deliberations, knew well in advance who the likely infring-
ers would be and what would be the nature of their infringement.412 
The socially preferable strategy is for them to communicate this to de-
velopers at a time when the developer can still make a choice. The 
plaintiffs chose to hold back, however, or even misrepresent their hold-
ings, in order to extract a larger award later.413 In such a case, the pat-
                                                                                                                      
with enhanced penalties up to treble damages. See Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 
406 F.3d 1347, 1357 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
409 See Chiang, supra note 295, at 85. 
410 See Cotter, supra note 244, at 1159, 1160 (suggesting that denial of injunctive relief 
may be specially justified in situations involving nonpracticing patentees); Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 211, at 2036 (stating a similar proposition); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. 
Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 783, 798–99 
(2007) (opposing injunctions in some situations). But the issue has been controversial. See 
Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 
4 J. Competition L. & Econ. 535, 537 (2008) (arguing in favor of preserving most injunc-
tive relief); Damien Geradin et al., The Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing 
the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 144, 174–75 (2008) (stating a 
similar idea); John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2111, 
2148–49 (2007) (suggesting a rebuttable presumption of injunctive relief). 
411 See Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 Mich. 
Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 421, 424 (2007); Bernard H. Chao, After eBay Inc. v. MercEx-
change: The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 543, 544 
(2008); Vincenzo Deniocolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech 
Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 571, 572–73 (2008). 
412 See Qualcomm, 548 F.3d at 1008; Rambus, 522 F.3d at 459. 
413 See Qualcomm, 548 F.3d at 1008; Rambus, 522 F.3d at 459. 
2010] IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm 967 
entee should not be permitted to obtain more relief than damages 
measured by the value of substitute technologies ex ante—that is, prior 
to the time that a dedicated commitment was made.414 
 On the other side of the notice issue is the question of whether the 
infringer knew of the infringement at the time it developed its technol-
ogy. If he did not know, then the case for an injunction is weak, particu-
larly if the patentee was not producing the patented invention or if pat-
ent enforcement was based on a continuation application that was 
pending when the infringer’s technology was developed and backdated 
to the date of original patent filing.415 By contrast, the developer who 
knows in advance about another’s patent but chooses to infringe it 
anyway is in a much different position. In that case, the award of an in-
junction is more appropriate because the developer could have negoti-
ated a license in advance, when the full range of alternatives was still 
available. Further, whether or not the patentee is practicing the patent 
does not matter all that much. 
  In sum, the remedy system should be designed so as to reward 
patentees who give adequate and timely notice of their claims and to 
penalize those who do not. It should avoid penalizing innocent infring-
ers and instead penalize those who proceeded to develop patented 
technology even though they knew or suspected they would infringe on 
the patents.416 
 None of this discussion is intended as a brief for either side of the 
question whether property or liability rules should protect IP owners.417 
Those who want to preserve broad property rights generally emphasize 
the systematic undercompensation they believe results from judicial 
determinations of damages, and the resulting harm to the incentive to 
innovate.418 Otherwise, they are concerned about the market integrity 
of prices determined by judges rather than buyers and sellers.419 Those 
                                                                                                                      
414 See Hovenkamp, supra note 208. 
415 On the problem of patent continuations, see supra notes 235--260 and accompany-
ing text. 
416 Hovenkamp, supra note 208. 
417 See Crane, supra note 406, at 253–54. 
418 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property, 
Regulation, Winter 2008, at 62 (“[S]ystematic under-compensation during the limited 
life of a patent is likely to reduce the level of innovation while increasing the administra-
tive costs of running the entire system.”); see also Elhauge, supra note 410, at 537. 
419 See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1776–77 
(2004). 
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who favor relaxing injunction entitlements are concerned mainly with 
holdup and excessive royalties.420 
 The concern about chronic undercompensation has merit, but 
mainly in a system with well-defined property rights and adequate and 
timely notice to outsiders. And holdup is surely of concern when in-
fringers are taken by surprise in circumstances where an objectively rea-
sonable person would not have known about the right. But the availabil-
ity of remedies can be metered in a way that minimizes both concerns. 
On the one hand, when IP rights holders have taken all reasonable steps 
to communicate their rights to others, including specific and timely 
communications to those it knows are likely to infringe, then the case 
for equity relief is much stronger than when they keep silent while 
knowing of likely infringement, or take other steps to withhold informa-
tion about their rights.421 On the other hand, an infringer who had 
good reason to know she was infringing at the time she made her in-
vestment should not be heard later to complain that she is being held 
up by a rapacious troll seeking to appropriate her investment. But an 
infringer who acted reasonably and had no reason to suspect infringe-
ment until it is too late makes a good case for a damages remedy. As the 
infringement itself moves further away from anything that was foresee-
able to the innovator at the time of its innovation, perhaps because the 
claims were overly abstract or were the unpublished contents of a con-
tinuation application, the case for an injunction grows much weaker. 
 To be sure, not every bargaining problem goes away when people 
have timely knowledge of property rights. For example, bilateral mo-
nopoly problems exist even when property rights are well-defined.422 
Such problems are likely to arise when a standard-setting organization 
dominates its market and the patentee has a clearly superior technol-
                                                                                                                      
420 See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 Wash. L. Rev. 39, 46 
(2008); see also Golden, supra note 407, at 513; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 211, at 1993; 
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 
2163, 2172–73 (2007). 
421 The penalty of judicially determined royalties rather than an injunction for the pa-
tentee who fails to provide effective, timely notice of its rights strikes some as severe. See, 
e.g., Elhauge, supra note 410, at 537. But one should keep in mind that the penalty to the 
real property owner who fails to provide adequate notice is often complete loss of title. Cf. 
Holbrook, supra note 215, at 146. And where search costs are higher, the property owner 
should have an even stronger obligation to provide notice. See Hovenkamp, supra note 208. 
422 See Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 55 S. Econ. J. 
831, 831–32 (1989). On the particular problem in standard setting, see J. Gregory Sidak, 
Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting Organizations, 5 J. Comp. L. & 
Econ. 123, 188 (2009). 
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ogy to offer.423 The two sides are then thrust into a situation where they 
can deal only with each other, or at least where offers from everyone 
else are clearly inferior.424 
 Ultimately, neither antitrust policy nor IP policy may be able to 
solve bilateral monopoly problems. But bilateral monopoly is ubiqui-
tous and hardly limited to the context of IP rights.425 Of course, buyers’ 
cartels are unlawful when they are found, and antitrust’s rule of reason 
is designed for such situations.426 A standard-setting organization that is 
nothing more than a front for a cartel ought to be condemned under 
the antitrust laws. One that is engaged in true “joint purchasing” of 
technology that will be used to facilitate a valuable common standard, 
however, will be approved even if it has power in the buying market.427 
Buyer power problems are likely to arise when a group of firms that 
dominate a market set a mandatory standard, as is likely to be the case 
of technologies such as network compatible communications devices.428 
In such cases, we may have to countenance a legitimate buying organi-
zation that is able to suppress the price of the technology that it pur-
chases. But that is hardly an argument for the patentee’s concealment 
of his rights until the buyers have made their investments. 
 “Judicial” patent reform is underway, and the problems of over-
breadth, notice and priority are significantly less imposing today than 
they were a decade ago. At the same time, KSR and eBay are relatively 
recent decisions.429 At this writing it is difficult to predict what their full 
impact will be. Even Bilski, whose holding did not move reform signifi-
cantly, indicates a concern that too many patents are being issued—a 
concern that all nine justices shared. The five-justice majority noted 
that “while § 273 [of the Patent Act] appears to leave open the possibil-
ity of some business method patents, it does not suggest broad pat-
entability of such claimed inventions.”430 Four concurring justices 
                                                                                                                      
423 See Sidak, supra note 422, at 188. 
424 See id. 
425 See Fennell, supra note 402, at 1423–24 (discussing problems of bilateral monopoly 
and proposing revision of alienability rules to address them); Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 633, 640–49 (2009) (explaining bilat-
eral monopoly in Coasian markets). 
426 See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 21. 
427See Herbert Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 
87, 91–92, 95 (2007). 
428 Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 271, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that a standard-setting organization for cellular phones acted reasonably in set-
ting a standard that excluded the plaintiff’s technology), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2055 (2009). 
429 See generally KSR, 550 U.S. 398 (2007); eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
430 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3222; see supra notes 353--400 and accompanying text. 
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would have abolished business method patents altogether. Further, by 
joining in a portion of Justice Breyer’s concurrence, Justice Scalia 
clearly agreed that under Federal Circuit law too many trivial method 
patents are being granted.431 All of the “absurd” patents that Justice 
Breyer mentioned in that portion of his opinion, including patents for 
“training janitors to dust and vacuum using video displays,” a “system 
for toilet reservations,” and a “method of using color-coded bracelets to 
designate dating status in order to limit ‘the embarrassment of rejec-
tion,’” had in fact been granted under Federal Circuit standards as de-
veloped in its State Street decision.432 In sum, one cannot read the three 
opinions in Bilski without getting the clear message that the Supreme 
Court wants the Federal Circuit to continue cutting back on the num-
ber of minor patents as it indicated in its own Bilski decision. Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court did not give much direction as to how this 
should be accomplished. 
D. Legislative and Regulatory Sources of Patent Reform 
 The impetus for patent reform is also coming from other sources. 
Recently, the PTO itself initiated several reforms.433 One of the most 
important reforms, which a panel of the Federal Circuit subsequently 
rejected, was to impose severe limitations on patent continuations.434 
Under the proposed regulations, a patent applicant would have been 
entitled to two continuation applications subsequent to the original 
application.435 If a third application were filed, the applicant would 
have to show that her claims could not have been stated in the previous 
applications.436 Otherwise, the third application would be treated as a 
new application and given its own filing date for priority purposes.437 
The Federal Circuit struck down this rule as a violation of the patent 
statute’s requirement that the validity date of a patent relate back to its 
initial filing date.438 
                                                                                                                      
431 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3257 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
432 See id. at 3259; State St., 149 F.3d at 1370. The list came from Judge Mayer’s dissent-
ing opinion in the Federal Circuit’s In re Bilski decision. See 545 F.3d at 1004 (Mayer, J., 
dissenting). 
433 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 148, at 220, 236. 
434 See id. at 236. 
435 See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 328 F. 
App’x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
436 See id. 
437 See id. 
438 See id. at 1364. The Federal Circuit has granted a rehearing en banc. See Tafas v. 
Doll, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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 The 2009 Patent Reform Act, currently pending before Congress, 
where it faces an uncertain future, moves the United States from a “first 
to invent” to a “first to file” system for determining priority, places limits 
on patent damages to the “specific contribution over prior art” that the 
patented invention makes to the infringer’s technology, and provides 
for expanded reexamination processes with increased opposition al-
lowed by third parties.439 The bill, however, does not address most of 
the problems described in this Part. Further, Congress has been beset 
by lobbying over patent legislation, and previous patent reform bills 
have failed.440 As a result, the most significant patent reforms are likely 
to come not from statutory amendments or even from PTO rulemak-
ing, but rather from the courts. 
IV. Reformation in Copyright 
 The situation for copyright is bleaker than for patents. Although 
core copyright protection is arguably necessary to allow authors and 
other copyright holders to prevent harmful piracy of their works, the 
1976 Copyright Act confers excessively broad copyrights that prohibit 
most copying of copyrighted material, even when the copying does no 
harm to the copyright holder’s incentives to create or distribute their 
works.441 Indeed, the Act shows the signs of special interest capture 
even more than the Patent Act does: it benefits well-organized interest 
groups while imposing costs on the general public; it contains numer-
ous special provisions favoring various interest groups; the legislative 
history shows extensive interest group involvement; and the scope of 
statutory rights is indefensible on public interest grounds.442 Yet, unlike 
in patent law, there is no reform on the horizon for copyright law.443 
 As Jessica Litman has written, “Unlike the porous 1909 [Copy-
right] Act, the 1976 Act is a detailed comprehensive code, chock-full of 
                                                                                                                      
439 Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. 
440 See Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong.; Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 
1145, 110th Cong.; Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.; Patent Reform Act 
of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong.; Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. 
441 See Bohannan, supra note 4, at 1031. 
442 See Bohannan, supra note 77, at 568 (showing that the Copyright Act bears all the 
indicia of special-interest legislation). 
443 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and Reform, 96 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. (forth-
coming 2010); Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474929 (noting need 
for copyright reform, including making personal uses non-infringing and giving greater 
rights to authors and lesser rights to intermediaries such as producers and publishers). 
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specific heavily negotiated compromises.”444 The current statute is gen-
erally characterized by broad rights for copyright holders and narrow, 
specific exemptions for users.445 For instance, the copyright holder’s 
right of public performance generally excludes others from “perform-
ing” a work in public.446 As the right is defined, it is broad enough to 
cover singing a song to oneself while walking through a public shop-
ping mall, although one of the specifically drawn exemptions to this 
right might ultimately defeat a finding of infringement.447 Moreover, 
the statute grants to copyright holders the exclusive rights not only to 
copy but also to modify, transform, or adapt the copyrighted work in 
any way.448 Put together, these broad rights prohibit most copying of 
copyrighted material unless some exception applies.449 In addition, 
these rights endure for several generations: for the life of the author 
plus seventy years in the case of a work by a natural author, or for 
ninety-five years in the case of a work for hire.450 
 The scope and duration of these rights far exceed what is neces-
sary to encourage the creation and dissemination of copyrighted works. 
Although the goal of the IP Clause of the Constitution is to “promote 
the Progress of Science” by allowing Congress to grant copyrights only 
“for limited Times,”451 the current copyright term is the economic 
                                                                                                                      
444 Litman, supra note 110, at 859. 
445 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–112 (2006). 
446 See id. § 106(4). 
447 See id. § 110(4) (exempting the noncommercial performance of a nondramatic lit-
erary or musical work). The other statutory exemptions to the public performance right 
are narrowly drawn to exempt activities such as “face-to-face” teaching in a non-profit edu-
cational institution or for performing a non-dramatic literary or musical work of a reli-
gious nature in the course of worship. See id. § 110(1). 
448 See id. § 106(2). 
449 See Landes & Posner, supra note 131, at 110. Landes and Posner argue: 
[S]ince it is uncertain whether any copyright protection, let alone the amount 
conferred by current law, is necessary to enable authors and publishers to re-
cover the fixed costs that must be incurred to generate the socially optimal 
output of expressive works, it would be speculative to conclude that without 
control over derivative works authors and publishers would be unable to 
cover those costs. 
Id. 
450 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c) (2006). 
451 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 260 (2003) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the Patent and Copyright Clause “assumes that it is 
the disappearance of the monopoly grant, not its perpetuation, that will, on balance, promote 
the dissemination of works already in existence”). 
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equivalent of indefinite ownership.452 The scope of copyright protec-
tion is similarly problematic.453 A copyright holder can enjoin or de-
mand royalties for virtually all copying, regardless of whether that copy-
ing was of a kind likely to harm the copyright holder’s incentives to in-
novate.454 
 To be sure, the fair use doctrine considers harm to the “market for 
. . . the copyrighted work” as one factor in determining whether a use is 
fair.455 There are, however, numerous problems with its approach. First, 
harm is not a strict requirement but is merely one factor to be consid-
ered in the analysis.456 Second, because fair use is treated as an affirma-
tive defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show the ab-
sence of harm.457 Third, harm is so poorly defined in the case law that 
the concept has become circular.458 Because the statute grants copy-
right holders virtually complete control over copying of their copy-
righted works, a copyright holder can always argue that the defendant’s 
copying caused her harm because the defendant could have paid her a 
license fee for the very copying that the defendant claims is fair.459 The 
effects of this circularity are far-reaching. It causes risk-averse users to 
obtain licenses even when they are unnecessary, and then the existence 
                                                                                                                      
452 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 255–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer explained the 
perpetual nature of such copyright term extensions, noting that: 
The present extension will produce a copyright period of protection that, 
even under conservative assumptions, is worth more than 99.8% of protec-
tion in perpetuity (more than 99.99% for a songwriter like Irving Berlin and a 
song like Alexander’s Ragtime Band). . . . The lack of a practically meaningful 
distinction from an author’s ex ante perspective between (a) the statute’s ex-
tended terms and (b) an infinite term makes this latest extension difficult to 
square with the Constitution’s insistence on “limited Times.” 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
453 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
454 See id. §§ 502–505. 
455 See id. § 107. 
456 See id. (listing four factors courts must consider in fair use analysis); Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994) (discussing fair use factors and stating 
that no single factor is dispositive). 
457 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (explaining that the defendant bears the burden of 
proof on fair use). 
458 See, e.g., id. at 590–91. 
459 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 
1996) (discussing circularity problem); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 
913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the same issue); see also Bohannan, supra note 4, at 
978–79; Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 185, 190–91 (2007); Matthew Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in 
Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1145, 1174–
75 (2000). 
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of those licenses tends to reify the notion that the right to control such 
uses exists.460 Moreover, courts hold that the copyright holder is enti-
tled to licensing fees even for uses that increase demand for the original 
copyrighted work—that is, for uses that are effectively complements to 
rather than substitutes for the copyrighted work.461 
 The fundamental problem here is that the harm element in fair 
use is not tied to copyright’s purpose of encouraging innovation. Al-
though a court might consider whether the defendant should compen-
sate a particular copyright holder for a particular use, the court does 
not inquire into whether the copyright holder would have relied on 
compensation for that use in deciding whether to create or distribute 
the copyrighted work. 
 Courts have found infringement or likely infringement in numer-
ous cases where harm to the copyright holder’s incentives was nonexis-
tent, speculative, or trivial.462 For instance, in the 2001 case Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia preliminarily enjoined publication of a book enti-
tled The Wind Done Gone by Alice Randall, concluding that success on 
the fair use defense was unlikely.463 Randall’s book borrowed characters 
and plot lines, among other things, from the novel Gone With the Wind 
in order to produce a new story that critiqued the classic story by re-
telling portions of it from the point of view of a young slave girl.464 De-
spite acknowledging the critical and parodic character of The Wind Done 
Gone, and with little or no supporting evidence involving likely market 
effects, the district court held that the new work was likely to substitute 
for authorized sequels of Gone With the Wind.465 
                                                                                                                      
460 See Gibson, supra note 404, at 884 (“[T]he practice of licensing within gray areas 
eventually makes those areas less gray, as the licensing itself becomes the proof that the 
entitlement covers the use.”). 
461 See Bohannan, supra note 77, at 596–97 (discussing examples of derivative works 
that increase sales of the original works on which they are based); see also Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns 
Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517–19 (7th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing between uses of copy-
righted material that are economic substitutes for the original work and uses that are eco-
nomic complements). 
462 See Bohannan, supra note 4, at 1001–02. 
463 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (Suntrust I ), 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 
(N.D. Ga. 2001), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’d, (Suntrust II ), 268 F.3d 1257, 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
464 See Suntrust II, 268 F.3d at 1270 (noting that The Wind Done Gone “is principally and 
purposefully a critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective, judg-
ments, and mythology of [Gone With the Wind],” and explaining that “[w]here Randall 
refers directly to Mitchell’s plot and characters, she does so in service of her general at-
tack” on the book). 
465 See Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1383. 
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 The U.S. Court of Appeals for Eleventh Circuit reversed the injunc-
tion.466 Its review of the record disclosed that the copyright holder, Sun-
trust, “focuses on the value of [Gone With the Wind] and its derivatives, 
but fails to address and offers little evidence or argument to demon-
strate that [The Wind Done Gone] would supplant demand for Suntrust’s 
licensed derivatives.”467 Indeed, since the preliminary injunction was 
reversed and the new book went on sale, anecdotal market evidence 
suggests that the book actually enhanced sales of the original and its de-
rivatives. Amazon.com reports that customers who have purchased the 
new book also have purchased the original Gone With the Wind novel, its 
authorized sequel Scarlett, and the authorized motion picture.468 
 More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York entered a permanent injunction against the sale and distribu-
tion of Lexicon, an encyclopedic reference guide to the Harry Potter se-
ries.469 The court first held that plaintiffs J.K. Rowling, author of the 
Harry Potter series, and Warner Brothers did not have the right to con-
trol the market for reference guides to their works, and therefore that 
Lexicon did not cause any cognizable harm to that market.470 The court 
also concluded that the reference guide was not likely to supplant sales 
of the original seven Harry Potter novels.471 The court opined, however, 
that Lexicon might potentially harm sales of Rowling’s two companion 
books, Quidditch Through the Ages and Fantastic Beasts & Where to Find 
                                                                                                                      
466 See Suntrust II, 268 F.3d at 1277. 
467 Id. at 1275 (“[T]he evidence proffered in support of the fair use defense specifically 
and correctly focused on market substitution and demonstrates why Randall’s book is 
unlikely to displace sales of [Gone With the Wind].”). 
468 See The Wind Done Gone: A Novel, Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/Wind-Done-
Gone-Novel/dp/0618219064/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1250356777&sr=1-1 (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2010). 
469 See Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
470 See id. at 550 (“Notwithstanding Rowling’s public statements of her intention to 
publish her own encyclopedia, the market for reference guides to the Harry Potter works is 
not exclusively hers to exploit or license, no matter the commercial success attributable to 
the popularity of the original works.”). 
471 See id. The court went on to state: 
Children may be an elusive market for book publishers, but it is hard to be-
lieve that a child, having read the Lexicon, would lose interest in reading (and 
thus his or her parents’ interest in purchasing) the Harry Potter series. . . . The 
Lexicon is thus unlikely to serve as a market substitute for the Harry Potter se-
ries and cause market harm. 
Id. 
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Them.472 There was no evidence of such harm, however, and it seems 
inappropriate to presume that an encyclopedic reference guide would 
supplant demand for Rowling’s own fictional books, which look and 
read very differently.473 For instance, Fantastic Beasts purports to be the 
main character’s—Harry Potter’s—own course book for his Magical 
Creatures class at Hogwarts and contains Harry’s own amusing hand-
written notes throughout.474 What is more, the court speculated that 
“[a]lthough there is no supporting testimony,” the Lexicon reference 
guide could possibly have an effect on future works, such as musical 
productions or “print publications of [the] songs and poems” that ap-
pear in the Harry Potter books.475 But the plaintiffs submitted no evi-
dence indicating that they planned to enter those markets, or that, if 
they did, the Lexicon would have any negative effect on those markets 
whatsoever.476 Indeed, it seems just as likely that the Lexicon reference 
guide would enhance sales of Rowling’s works in current and future 
markets. 
 In these cases and others like them, courts prohibit or discourage 
many uses of copyrighted works absent proof that the defendant’s use is 
likely to harm the plaintiff’s incentives to produce copyrighted 
works.477 This is a particular problem in cases involving transformative 
                                                                                                                      
472 See id. at 549–50. The court reasoned that “[u]nless they sought to enjoy the com-
panion books for their entertainment value alone, consumers who purchased the Lexicon 
would have scant incentive to purchase either of Rowling’s companion books, as the in-
formation contained in these short works has been incorporated into the Lexicon almost 
wholesale.” Id. Of course, the same could be said of Lexicon’s encyclopedic summaries of 
the seven original Harry Potter novels, but the court concluded that there was no likely 
harm to the market for those original novels. See id. Clearly, people do read Rowling’s 
books for the entertainment value, not merely to obtain the information therein. In any 
event, the point here is simply that courts should not presume harm in such cases but 
should require evidence showing that the defendant’s copying will actually reduce the 
copyright holder’s incentives. 
473 See id. at 549–51. 
474 See id. at 519. 
475 See RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 551. 
476 See id. 
477 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1386–87 (explaining that copyshop’s copy-
ing of college coursepacks was not fair use although professors testified that they would 
not have purchased copyrighted works in the absence of fair use and no other evidence 
indicated that copyright holders were worse off as a result of the copying); Ty, Inc. v. W. 
Highland Publ’g Inc., No. 98-C-4091, 1998 WL 698922, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1998) 
(granting preliminary injunction against defendant’s publication of reference guide to 
Ty’s Beanie Babies stuffed animals based on speculation that the guide might have a nega-
tive effect on their “marketing image” at some point in the future). 
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works, where others innovate by improving on existing works.478 At one 
time, such transformative works were themselves considered valuable 
“works of authorship” and, as such, were held to be noninfringing.479 As 
Landes and Posner have observed, these transformative uses often re-
quire substantial investment on the part of the improver, and therefore 
do not create the same free-riding problems that simple verbatim copy-
ing does.480 Moreover, many uses of copyrighted material are not only 
innovative, but also constitute protected speech.481 Thus, when copy-
right law prohibits the use of copyrighted expression absent proof of 
harm to copyright incentives, it creates a glaring exception to the First 
Amendment rule that government may not prohibit speech absent a 
showing that the speech causes harm to a significant governmental in-
terest.482 
 Evidence of copyright reform is very hard to find. To the contrary, 
in recent years, copyright law has been operating as a one-way ratchet 
favoring holders over consumers.483 On the legislative front, in 1998 
Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act (the “CTEA”), 
which extended the term of future and existing copyrights by twenty 
years.484 The Supreme Court later upheld retroactive application of this 
term extension to existing copyrighted works, despite the fact that ret-
roactive term extensions to existing works did little or nothing to pro-
mote innovation, while they significantly burdened future use and in-
novation by others.485 Recent copyright legislation has expanded copy-
                                                                                                                      
478 See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1167, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 1989) 
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479 See Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 10 (1966) (observing 
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rights even further. For instance, in the past few years, Congress has 
resurrected copyrights for many works that previously had fallen into 
the public domain.486 
 Unfortunately, unlike in patent and antitrust law, there is very little 
evidence of copyright reform in the courts. The Supreme Court has 
not been consistent in making copyright protection commensurate 
with copyright’s purpose. The Court’s 1984 decision in Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. recognized the centrality of harm 
and the need to prove it.487 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens ex-
plained: 
The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative 
effort. . . . [A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the 
potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work 
need not be prohibited in order to protect the author’s in-
centive to create. . . . Actual present harm need not be 
shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright holder 
with no defense against predictable damage. . . . What is 
necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.488 
The Court in Sony went on to hold that home copying of copyrighted 
television programs for purposes of “time-shifting,” or watching the pro-
grams at a later time, constituted fair use because the evidence showed 
that “‘[h]arm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal.’”489 
 Yet, the Court’s 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music seems 
to retreat from Sony.490 In Campbell, the Court held that the defendant 2 
                                                                                                                      
486 See Uruguay Round Agreement Acts (“URAA”), Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 
§ 514 (1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109 (2006)) (restoring U.S. copy-
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Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1262–63 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding provision 
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dations, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1393 (2009) (arguing that recent changes, such as the elimination 
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greater First Amendment scrutiny in the area of copyright). 
487 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). 
488 Id. at 450–51 (internal citations omitted). 
489 Id. at 454 (quoting the district court’s decision in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1979)); see Bohannan, supra note 4, at 
991–96 (showing the Sony Court’s harm-based approach to fair use). 
490 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594. 
2010] IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm 979 
Live Crew’s rap version of Roy Orbison’s song Oh, Pretty Woman rea-
sonably could be perceived as a parody of the original song.491 The 
Court sensibly concluded that copyright holders do not control the 
market for parodies and other criticism of their works, and therefore 
the unauthorized parody did not cause cognizable harm to that market 
under the Copyright Act.492 Although the Court did inquire into harm, 
it seemed less emphatic about the need to limit the scope of copyrights 
to protect only against the kind of harmful copying that is likely to re-
duce incentives to create and distribute copyrighted works.493 First, the 
Court stated that copyright holders do get to control satirical uses of 
their works, despite the difficulty of distinguishing between parody and 
satire and the seemingly low probability that copyright holders would 
rely on the market for satirical uses of their works in deciding whether 
to create or distribute their works.494 Second, the Court suggested that 
the defendant might lose on its fair use defense if its parody caused any 
harm to the remote market for non-parody rap versions of the original 
song, and it remanded for further findings on this issue.495 Third, al-
though there was no reason to presume on the facts that any harm had 
occurred or was likely to occur, the Court held that the defendant bore 
the burden to show the absence of harm as part of its fair use defense.496 
The Supreme Court’s ambivalence in these cases suggests that it has 
not felt the same urgency as it has in patent law to bring copyright law 
into harmony with its constitutional justification. 
V. Toward a Concept of “IP Injury” 
 Recent reforms, particularly in patent law, are promising steps to-
ward encouraging innovation and competition.497 Much, however, re-
mains to be done. Landes and Posner have argued that the common 
law can provide useful baselines for measuring the proper scope of IP 
entitlements because the common law is more insulated from special 
interests.498 As a result, judges are more likely to keep their eyes on the 
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ball.499 We agree, and we believe that IP can profitably borrow from the 
“common law” of antitrust as well. 
 In addition to substantive reforms, we propose a requirement of IP 
harm in infringement actions that would borrow from the “antitrust 
injury” doctrine and antitrust’s strict, common law-driven requirements 
that the right kind of harm and damages be proven.500 In IP law, prov-
able harm should relate to the incentive to innovate, just as in antitrust 
provable harm relates to the incentive to compete. By querying first 
how the plaintiff was injured, a court might avoid much more difficult 
decisions concerning the appropriate scope of patent or copyright pro-
tection. To be sure, imposing a harm requirement will not solve every 
problem of IP overreaching. The “antitrust injury” doctrine went a 
long way toward aligning antitrust policy with the incentives to com-
pete, but no small part of the antitrust revolution resulted from sub-
stantive changes in the law.501 Nevertheless, a serious harm requirement 
can help bridge the gap between the incentive to innovate and an im-
perfect doctrine. Even if the law dictates that an infringement has oc-
curred, plaintiffs who do not have the right kind of injury should be 
denied recovery. 
 One of us has already advocated for such a harm requirement in 
copyright cases, and here we extend the argument to patent infringe-
ment actions as well.502 The kind of harm necessary to support an in-
fringement action is different for patents, however, than for copy-
right.503 Someone obtains a copyright by producing a work and in most 
cases by registering it.504 The copyrighted work is what it is, and its 
“claims,” or boundaries, are defined by the work itself plus legal rules 
                                                                                                                      
499 See id. at 10, 87, 205–06. 
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about copying and fair use.505 By contrast, a patent consists of a detailed 
written description that refers to an invention that is something other 
than the patent document itself, and then states a set of unique 
“claims” asserting the specific parts of this invention that the patentee 
has invented.506 Thus, the patent provides us with a great deal more 
information about what the patentee actually “foresaw” as the inven-
tion, although the law is also present to determine what the applicant is 
entitled to claim. Overly broad patent claiming may create foreseeable 
entitlements, but these will do nothing to incentivize innovation and 
may even undermine it. Someone who holds a patent that never should 
have issued in the first place is certainly harmed by an infringement, 
but that is not the kind of harm that the patent system contemplates. 
To be sure, a patentee is entitled to rely on the Patent Act and the deci-
sions interpreting it, even if the system is poorly designed. At the same 
time, statutes must be interpreted, and courts often have room to con-
strue them broadly or narrowly. 
 In patent law foreseeability as of the time the work is created has a 
much more subjective dimension than copyright. The patentee’s own 
patent application and its prosecution history give us information 
about what the patent applicant actually foresaw and was entitled to 
foresee.507 Claims themselves can be invalid for claiming more than the 
inventor actually invented.508 Further, not all patent claims that are ul-
timately approved were included at the time the patent application was 
drafted.509 Some claims are drafted much later, sometimes even after 
the patent applicant has had a chance to inspect the technology of ri-
vals.510 The case for finding foreseeable harm diminishes significantly as 
the pedigree of a particular patent claim indicates that it was not a part 
of the original application. Closely related is the problem of priority. 
Because late-filed claims relate back to the date of the original patent 
application, they can give the patentee legal priority over technology 
that actually preceded the drafting of the claim that it infringed.511 In 
interpreting the scope and enforceability of late claims, the underlying 
principle should be that the patentee is harmed only by those in-
                                                                                                                      
505 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719, 720 
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fringements that affected the ex ante incentive to innovate in the first 
place. 
 Much of the revolution that has gone on in antitrust has pertained 
to private actions and the types of harm needed to support them. To-
day the great majority of actions are brought by private parties,512 and 
antitrust reform was driven by the idea that private litigants use the an-
titrust laws for anticompetitive ends, mainly to protect themselves from 
intense competition.513 With rare exceptions, the IP laws are enforced 
almost exclusively by private parties and the same critique applies to 
them. 
 The doctrine that has become the poster child for the reform of 
private antitrust litigation is the “antitrust injury” rule developed by the 
Supreme Court in its 1977 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. de-
cision.514 The Brunswick case is illustrative, both for how it relates its 
harm requirement to the goals of the antitrust laws, and how it imposes 
a limiting interpretation on a private enforcement provision that seems 
clear and expansive on its face.515 Finally, it illustrates how the injury 
doctrine can provide a correction for substantive doctrines that are 
ambiguous or not in synch with the underlying goals of the statute in 
question.516 
 The Brunswick plaintiff, Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, was a struggling, in-
dependent bowling alley in Pueblo, Colorado.517 It faced one competi-
tor, which was financially even worse off than itself.518 The competitor 
was also deeply in debt to its principal hardware supplier, Brunswick, a 
very large firm that produced an array of sporting goods, including 
equipment for bowling alleys.519 The rival bowling alley settled its debts 
under an arrangement in which Brunswick acquired the alley, gave it 
an infusion of cash, and began operating it as a subsidiary.520 The plain-
tiff then filed suit, claiming that Brunswick’s acquisition of the strug-
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gling alley was an unlawful merger.521 As a result, the plaintiff claimed, 
instead of being in a market where it faced a listless competitor on the 
verge of bankruptcy, it had to face a newly energized rival with substan-
tial resources from above.522 
 The facts immediately invite a double take. Merger law at the time 
probably made the merger unlawful.523 Further, the plaintiff was clearly 
“injured” by the merger.524 Being forced to compete with a rejuvenated, 
Brunswick-owned facility would be much tougher than competing with 
a debt-ridden independent.525 Thus, under a plain reading of the ex-
pansive private-action provision of the antitrust laws, which requires 
only injury and causation, all of the statutory language appeared to fa-
vor the plaintiff’s position, provided that it could show that the merger 
was unlawful.526 
 But the Supreme Court did not focus on whether the merger was 
technically unlawful.527 Indeed, it did not even reach the issue.528 The 
only thing that mattered was that the plaintiff was complaining about 
more competition rather than less in the Pueblo bowling market.529 The 
nature of the plaintiff’s complaint was that Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat would 
have been a dominant firm with a failing competitor, and that the 
merger forced him to face a much more aggressive rival.530 Clearly, rec-
ognizing such a complaint would be inimical to the goals of the anti-
trust laws. 
 The Supreme Court responded with a rule that requires a private 
antitrust plaintiff to show not just any injury, but antitrust injury—that 
is, injury that results from decreased competition.531 The rule was fash-
ioned by one of the Court’s great, pro-antitrust liberals and a survivor 
of the Warren Era, Justice Thurgood Marshall.532 Further, the antitrust 
injury rule that he formulated seems quite inconsistent with the statu-
tory language, which provides that: “[A]ny person who shall be injured 
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
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trust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages 
by him sustained . . . .”533 That language seems to be both mandatory 
and comprehensive: all it requires is an injury to business or property 
that is caused by an antitrust violation.534 Nevertheless, Justice Marshall 
wrote for a unanimous Court: 
 Every merger of two existing entities into one, whether law-
ful or unlawful, has the potential for producing economic re-
adjustments that adversely affect some persons. But Congress 
has not condemned mergers on that account; it has con-
demned them only when they may produce anticompetitive effects. 
Yet under the Court of Appeals’ holding, once a merger is found to vio-
late § 7, all dislocations caused by the merger are actionable, regard-
less of whether those dislocations have anything to do with the reason 
the merger was condemned. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the 
failing centers petitioner preserved competition. . . . The 
damages respondents obtained are designed to provide them 
with the profits they would have realized had competition 
been reduced. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]o recover treble damages on account of § 7 viola-
tions, [plaintiffs] must prove more than injury causally linked 
to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove anti-
trust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the 
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts 
made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be “the type of 
loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.”535 
 The Court’s decision in Brunswick revolutionized private antitrust 
enforcement, and lack of “antitrust injury” has led to the dismissal of 
hundreds of private antitrust cases.536 Indeed, antitrust injury is now 
treated as a doctrine of standing for private plaintiff actions; in assess-
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ing the plaintiff’s standing under this doctrine, courts assume for the 
sake of argument that there is an antitrust violation.537 
 Brunswick’s most notable features are its virtual disregard of both 
the question of a substantive violation as well as the language of anti-
trust’s statutory private action provision, which is in fact quite categori-
cal.538 It speaks of “any person” who is injured in business or property 
“by reason of” an antitrust violation.539 The statute itself says nothing 
about relating the nature of the injury to the competition-furthering 
goals of antitrust.540 Yet, today it is clear that the antitrust injury rule 
applies to equity actions just as much as to damages actions.541 Al-
though antitrust’s injunction provision requires only threatened harm 
of any type,542 the Supreme Court has held that “[i]t would be anoma-
lous . . . to read the Clayton Act to authorize a private plaintiff to secure 
an injunction against a threatened injury for which he would not be 
entitled to compensation if the injury actually occurred.”543 
 In IP today, as in antitrust thirty years ago, the courts too often 
equate the issue of actionable injury with the issue of infringement. As 
a first step in their own efforts toward reform, courts need to incorpo-
rate into IP laws a conception of “IP injury,” which would require not 
merely injury-in-fact or speculative injury, but rather demonstrable in-
jury that is tied to the purpose for which the IP laws were passed in the 
first place. IP law should recognize harm only for uses that are likely to 
interfere with IP holders’ ex ante decisions to create or distribute their 
works—that is, only for harms that are consistent with patent and copy-
right’s constitutionally mandated purpose of furthering innovation. 
 Of course, injury-in-fact typically accompanies infringement: the IP 
holder can say that the defendant could have paid a license fee for the 
use, even if the defendant’s use does not supplant sales of the copy-
righted work or patented invention. After all, the defendant is free-
riding on the IP holder’s work, and the IP holder should at least be al-
lowed to share in the benefits that the defendant gained from its use. 
 This argument reflects a view that free-riding is a wrong in and of 
itself, and that property rights in IP should internalize all of the benefits 
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that the IP produces for others. The argument both overstates and mis-
characterizes the nature of free-riding and the harm that it causes. Fur-
ther, it fails to relate free-riding to the incentive to create. As Brett 
Frischmann and Mark Lemley have observed, “Spillovers—uncom-
pensated benefits that one person’s activity provides to another—are 
everywhere.”544 It is both impossible and undesirable to compensate for 
all of them.545 Spillovers are one of the true benefits of investment in all 
kinds of property rights, intellectual or otherwise.546 Sellers of butter 
benefit from the production of better bread, yet bread producers are 
not entitled to a percentage of butter sales. Nor is the author of a popu-
lar, copyrighted opera entitled to a cut of a firm’s sales of opera glasses. 
Innovation has always benefited people other than the innovator, and 
the law has not attempted to capture all of those external benefits and 
return them.547 Quite the contrary, the IP Clause of the Constitution 
seeks to encourage innovation not for the benefit of the individual in-
ventor, but rather for the benefit of society at large.548 Significant inno-
vations tend to produce many valuable spillovers—that is why we en-
courage them.549 
 Indeed, innovators are themselves the beneficiaries of spillovers.550 
For example, the development of patented or copyrighted software 
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benefits greatly from a market that contains computers. The developer 
of a patented toaster benefits greatly from the fact that homes are 
equipped with electricity and that bakers make bread. But we do not 
require these inventors to compensate computer manufacturers, elec-
tric utilities or wholesale bakers. Or to view the issue from another per-
spective, the developers of computers or builders of electric utilities will 
not be compensated for every benefit that their work confers on the 
makers of collateral and complementary products. Uncompensated 
spillovers go in both directions, and indeed, some IP rights become 
very valuable precisely because they sit atop the technology developed 
by others.551 For example, Microsoft Windows’ value depends entirely 
on the existence of a computer hardware infrastructure that Microsoft 
itself did not develop. 
 IP law has become too obsessed with the notion that spilling over is 
itself a wrong for which compensation is due, or that the IP holder is 
entitled to compensation for every external benefit that its right pro-
duces, whether or not there is a reduction in the incentive to innovate. 
Spillovers are the “surplus” that innovation produces, just as the con-
sumers’ surplus, or the difference between value and price, is the sur-
plus that well-functioning markets produce. Requiring IP holders to be 
compensated for spillovers would be tantamount to requiring monopo-
lists to be compensated up to the full value that customers place on the 
goods they sell. Antitrust is built on the bedrock principle that con-
sumers are antitrust’s protected class; consumers, not manufacturers, 
are thus entitled to any surplus that increased competition produces.552 
 IP law needs a similar approach that requires compensation only 
where the defendant’s use harms the IP holder’s ex ante incentives to 
innovate. Often the defendant’s use actually increases the IP holder’s 
incentives to innovate by increasing sales of the original work.553 Con-
sider the British Da Vinci Code case. Dan Brown wrote the blockbuster 
novel The Da Vinci Code, a religious historical thriller involving a roman-
tic relationship that allegedly existed between Jesus Christ and Mary 
Magdelene.554 Brown’s book borrowed heavily from a nonfiction book 
by Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh, and Henry Lincoln entitled Holy 
Blood, Holy Grail, which explored the Jesus/Mary Magdelene story.555 
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When Da Vinci Code was published, Holy Blood’s sales increased dramati-
cally, restoring it briefly to the British best-seller list.556 But that did not 
prevent its publisher from filing a copyright infringement suit in a Brit-
ish court.557 The court eventually found no infringement because, al-
though Brown apparently borrowed uncopyrightable facts and ideas, 
he borrowed only a trivial amount of copyrighted expression.558 
 Clearly, The Da Vinci Code is not a substitute for, but rather a com-
plement to, Holy Blood, Holy Grail. When goods are complements, sales 
of one increase sales of the other—for example, cheaper butter in-
creases bread sales and better software increases computer sales. Prod-
uct complementarity increases, rather than decreases, the incentive to 
innovate. As a result, permitting infringement actions against comple-
ments is inconsistent with the goals of copyright law unless the com-
plementary work is one that the copyright owner was very likely to de-
velop itself. Although the authors of Holy Blood, Holy Grail might con-
ceivably have contemplated a novel based on their nonfiction work, it 
certainly would not have been the novel that Dan Brown wrote. Ex 
ante, the prediction that someone will base a best-selling novel on the 
author’s nonfiction historical book would almost certainly have in-
creased rather than reduced that author’s incentive to write it. 
 Spillovers become a problem only when they seriously threaten the 
incentive to invest in the first place. Spillovers that cause no foreseeable 
harm or that actually benefit the IP holder do not fall into this cate-
gory. Under current IP infringement standards, about the only thing 
that we can say ab initio about an infringing work is that it is a spillover. 
Without analysis, we cannot conclude whether it harms, benefits, or has 
no impact on the value of an IP holder’s rights. We certainly cannot say 
whether condemning it is worth the costs of doing so, including the 
loss of innovation on the part of others. 
Conclusion 
 IP owners have been enriched for many years by expansive private 
enforcement provisions that presume harm and base damages on fac-
tors such as the infringer’s profits or largely hypothetical lost licensing 
fees. Moreover, IP owners have not had to provide any proof that the IP 
                                                                                                                      
556 See id. (noting that sales of the plaintiff’s book had increased some 3500 percent). 
557 See James M. Klatell, Mining Da Vinci, CBS News (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.cbsnews. 
com/stories/2006/03/10listening_post/main1390534.shtml; see also Bohannan, supra note 
481, at 18 n.92; Bohannan, supra note 4, at 1028–29. 
558 See Baigent v. Random House Group Ltd., [2006] EWHC (Ch) 719 (Eng.) ¶ 182 (find-
ing mainly copying of ideas rather than expression), aff’d, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 247 (Eng.). 
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owner has been harmed in a way that is likely to diminish her incentive 
to innovate in the first place. As our experience in antitrust law has 
shown, one problem with per se rules of this sort is that they fail to 
make records about actual effects. For example, one of the reasons that 
we know so little about the economic consequences of resale price 
maintenance, or supplier fixing of the prices at which their goods can 
be resold, is that resale price maintenance was unlawful per se from 
1911 until 2007.559 During that time, a plaintiff proved illegality by sim-
ply showing the agreement to maintain prices, and no one cared about 
anticompetitive effects.560 As a result, the litigation process rarely de-
termined what were these effects. The same is true in IP cases. For in-
stance, in the Wind Done Gone case discussed earlier, the lower court’s 
preliminary injunction, based in part on a presumption that the defen-
dant’s copying would cause irreparable harm, precluded the develop-
ment of facts regarding the effects of the defendant’s parody on the 
market for the plaintiff’s work. 
 By contrast, requiring serious proof of harm in IP infringement 
cases would enable courts to develop records that could provide infor-
mation about the kinds of infringements that actually diminish IP 
holders’ investment expectations. In order to limit IP protection to that 
which is necessary to encourage innovation, IP injury must measure 
incentives ex ante rather than ex post. Infringement harms innovation 
when it diminishes anticipated returns, and the only effects that can be 
anticipated are those that are reasonably foreseeable.561 Indeed, if an 
act of IP infringement does no harm to the rights owner but benefits 
either the infringer or its customers and does not affect anyone else, 
then that act is a pure Pareto improvement—an economic ideal that is 
true of very few involuntary transactions. Condemning such an act 
would be inefficient legal policy even without regard to the lost incen-
tives to innovate that it creates and the transaction costs of employing 
the legal system. The trick, of course, is defining the circumstances un-
der which the IP owner is injured. An infringement in a market that 
the IP holder would never have entered anyway “injures” him only in 
                                                                                                                      
559 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881, 882 (2007); 
Bork & Bowman, supra note 20, at 364–65. 
560 At least, not until the Supreme Court imposed the “antitrust injury” doctrine on 
maximum resale price maintenance. See Atl. Richfield v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 
345–46 (1990) (explaining that antitrust injury doctrine bars recovery from rivals claiming 
that prices imposed by competitor on its dealers were too low and stating that it did not 
matter that at the time maximum resale price maintenance was unlawful per se). 
561 See Bohannan, supra note 4, at 988–89. 
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the sense that he could have obtained a royalty but did not—that is, it 
fails to make him better off. 
 In both patent and copyright infringement, a serious harm re-
quirement would entail remedies for “naked” infringement, or instances 
where acts of infringement clearly deprive the IP right holder of sales. It 
would also require remedies for infringements in obvious markets 
where the infringer is not a competitor but it is clear that an innovator 
would rely on those royalties in deciding whether to create the work. 
This would include, for example, movie versions of copyrighted novels 
and short stories, translations, or lengthy published excerpts. On the 
other hand, it would suggest little or no protection for situations where 
any harm caused by the alleged infringement is merely speculative. If a 
particular use is unlikely to affect the IP holder’s decision to produce a 
work, then it should not be deemed infringing. Thus, there should or-
dinarily be no finding of infringement where the defendant produces a 
complementary good that increases sales of the protected good or 
where the defendant uses the work for personal, non-commercial pur-
poses for which ordinary people are likely unwilling to pay. 
 The injury requirement would also preclude finding infringement 
where the infringer’s use occupies a market that is remote from the IP 
holder’s original market. Here, a page of antitrust law is helpful, par-
ticularly the law of nascent or unestablished businesses as plaintiffs. An-
titrust permits firms that are about to enter new markets to recover for 
antitrust violations, but only under strictly defined circumstances. The 
plaintiff who claims “I would have entered this market but for the de-
fendant’s anticompetitive conduct” must typically show “intent and 
preparedness,” which generally requires an investment, a set of business 
plans, or other commitments to show that the defendant actually de-
prived the plaintiff of an opportunity that it had foreseen and to which 
it had made a substantial commitment.562 
 The unestablished business requirements in antitrust are rules 
about standing or entitlement to sue. Like the antitrust-injury doctrine, 
                                                                                                                      
562 See 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 43, ¶ 349, at 225–28; see also, e.g., Aviation 
Upgrade Techs., Inc. v. Boeing Co., 78 F. App’x 623, 624, 625 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying 
standing to nascent firm that had no experience in the market, no plant, no employees 
other than its principal, no financing, and did not have required FAA certification); 
Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 712 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that plaintiff did 
not have an antitrust case); Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 315 F.3d 
1245, 1249–53, 1268 (10th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a firm that owned some mineral 
leases but had not yet determined whether entry into phosphate production would be 
profitable, had not obtained financing, and had no experience in production, lacked anti-
trust standing). 
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these rules were made in the face of a statute that proclaims that anyone 
who is injured in her business or property has an entitlement to dam-
ages. Further, because they are rules of standing, they assume that there 
was in fact an antitrust violation, just as the antitrust-injury doctrine 
does.563 These rules of standing are driven by the great ambiguity that 
attends any determination that exclusionary conduct actually violates 
the antitrust laws, about appraising the degree of harm in the absence 
of evidence of a clearly injured plaintiff, and our desire to create the 
right set of incentives for businesses to compete aggressively without 
worrying too much about harming rivals, particularly when harms to 
investment incentives are difficult to estimate. 
 Similar considerations should apply in IP infringement cases. Al-
though it is much easier to decide to license a particular use of IP than 
to build a factory, IP holders must have to prove more than speculative 
harm. We want innovators to have sufficient incentives to innovate, but 
not to ride roughshod over the public domain or the innovative ideas 
of others. Efficient incentives do not require capture of the value of 
every spillover. 
 It is no answer to say that IP owners “expect” that they will be 
compensated for every infringement, whether foreseeable or not. That 
rationale confuses ex ante and ex post expectations. Ex post, the 
farmer gets to keep the gold that was buried on his property. But ex 
ante, the possible presence of gold affects his willingness to purchase 
the land and the price he will pay only to the extent that he anticipates 
that the gold is there and he can place a probability and value on its 
presence. Innovators are presumably not willing to spend infinite dol-
lars on a research project simply because the sum of all conceivable 
foreseeable and unforeseeable results might be infinitely large. Their 
willingness to invest, just as that of any other reasonable actor, is a func-
tion of what they can anticipate. To the extent the publisher of a novel 
can foresee a good market for a translation or movie rights, she will be 
willing to pay more. If the publication is a law book, for example, she 
may foresee translation rights but probably not movie rights. Antitrust 
law has developed rules for determining the types of plaintiffs that have 
a sufficient, objectively determined commitment to a certain market 
that they have not yet entered.564 On the accused infringer’s side, reli-
able predictions about what does and does not constitute an infringe-
ment will also greatly facilitate the incentive to make efficient invest-
                                                                                                                      
563 See 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 43, ¶ 335f, at 73. 
564 Id. ¶ 349, at 225–28. 
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ments. When a new venture was objectively foreseeable to the IP holder 
at the time the work was developed, it will also be foreseeable to an in-
novator who wishes to borrow from the IP holder’s work. In that case, 
the innovator will know she must obtain a license. 
 An IP injury requirement would help to limit the scope of IP rights 
to the purpose for which they are granted. In addition, the IP injury 
requirement can help to provide adequate notice of IP claims. The best 
way to facilitate this set of values in an uncertain world is to give IP right 
holders the right to exclude in markets where they are actually operat-
ing. This right should also apply in markets in which IP right holders 
have made an actual initial investment or in which one can reasonably 
foresee investment as likely, looking from the time that a decision to 
commit resources to innovation is made. 
 Antitrust reform came about almost entirely through judicial rather 
than legislative initiatives. From the late 1970s and continuing through 
today, the Supreme Court has acted to dismantle most of the expansion-
ism that had occurred in the 1960s and earlier. The Supreme Court has 
been taking the lead in patent reform as well. What will happen in copy-
right is difficult to say. When the courts get the urge for reform, there is 
little to stop them—this was the case in antitrust law, where courts were 
inspired to produce rulings that were sensible but quite inconsistent 
with statutory language.565 Whether reform impulses will drive the judi-
ciary to such lengths in IP law is less certain. On the one hand, the IP 
statutes are more elaborate, more recent, and subject to more frequent 
congressional intervention. On the other hand, however, there is also 
considerable evidence that Congress is “stuck”—that it cannot muster 
the collective will to engage in serious reform, and that it resorts to in-
terest groups to become its statutory drafters. For this reason, we think 
that the judicial system has a comparative advantage, and the scales tip 
in favor of the judiciary even more strongly in IP than in antitrust be-
cause the extent of legislative capture is greater in IP. 
 It is therefore useful for courts to keep in mind that the patent and 
copyright laws have explicit authorization in the Constitution—much 
more explicit than the very general language of the Commerce Clause 
that enables the antitrust laws—and that this authorization expressly 
ties the IP rights created to the incentive to create. Thus, IP has a pow-
erful guiding principle. It need only be used. 
                                                                                                                      
565 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); supra notes 
531--543 and accompanying text; see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 
(1977) (explaining that only direct purchasers may maintain action for overcharge dam-
ages); 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 43, ¶ 337, at 86. 
